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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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8 OCTOBER 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET JOURNAL ON ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 8, Aug 86 pp 41-48

[Article by P. Filippov]

[Text]

Regarding universal and complete disarmament, and above all the elimination of nuclear weapons, as a historic task, the CPSU, as stated in its Programme, will consistently work to halt production and destroy other types of mass destruction weapons, including chemical weapons. A major step in this sphere were the new Soviet proposals on the total banning of chemical weapons submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament this April. The Soviet draft envisages the removal of chemical weapons from the military arsenals of states parties to the future convention, an end to their development and production, and the physical destruction of the existing stockpiles and production facilities under strict control, including on-site international inspection. The goal pursued by the USSR is to save mankind from the horrors of chemical war.

The adoption of the Soviet proposals, as was again stressed in the Soviet government's statement Peace and Environment, would be highly important for the solution of other global problems facing mankind linked with protecting people's health and preserving the environment from the toxic effects of different chemical weapons.

The use of the existing stockpiles of this type of mass destruction weapons for military purposes would lead to a fatal outcome for mankind and presents a real threat to the environment. Chemical weapons pose a potential danger to man's health and his surroundings even in peacetime: during their testing, manufacturing and stockpiling. This is confirmed by numerous facts.

SYMPOSIUM IN HO CHI MINH CITY

In January 1983 Ho Chi Minh City, the capital of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, hosted a highly representative international scientific symposium where scientists and experts from the SRV, the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and many other countries met to discuss a range of questions dealing with the long-term consequences of US aggression in South Vietnam and map out the directions of research for eliminating the after-effects of US chemical warfare.

The participants in the symposium came across the first traces of crimes perpetrated by the US military in Vietnam when they stepped out of the plane in Ho Chi Minh Airport. Not far from the runway were the transport airplanes left behind by the US Air Force during its spee-

dy flight from Southeast Asia in 1972. They had been equipped with special devices for chemical warfare and were used to spray South Vietnam with 7,000 tons of irritating toxic agent CS and over 90,000 tons of chemical defoliants.

The chief base of the US Air Force in South Vietnam was stationed in Bien Hoa not far from Ho Chi Minh City. Most of its facilities have been preserved up to this day. In the years of US aggression Bien Hoa was the site of a field military-chemical plant (one of three in this theatre of war) manufacturing Agent Orange and other combat herbicides.

Near Ho Chi Minh City one can see the remains of a US chemical weapons depot which had contained stockpiles of chemical mines, bomb clusters, "air-to-surface" missiles; diverse grenades and CS-gas pot-shots. The participants in the international symposium learned more about the crimes of the US military in Vietnam by studying the exhibits displayed in the unique museum of military history in Ho Chi Minh City.

Yet this material evidence of the crushing defeat of US aggression in Vietnam was not the only thing that brought scientists and experts to this scientific symposium. Ecologists, biologists and physicians working in different fields of medicine were alarmed by the long-standing effects of the large-scale chemical war waged many years ago on the people's health and the environment.

The term "scorched earth" tactics was coined during the Second World War. It denoted the purposeful devastation of large areas of land by the Nazi invaders, the total eradication of all populated areas along with their housing, industrial and public facilities. The "scorched earth" tactics were engendered by the criminal policy of the Nazi leaders and its implementation was facilitated by the increased destructive power of weapons, especially towards the end of the Second World War.

In those years these tactics were adopted by the US Armed Forces as well. Suffice it to recall the napalm bombs dropped by the US Air Force on German cities when this was not necessary for war purposes. One cannot forget that a single massive air raid on Tokyo when barrels with napalm were dropped from US aircraft destroyed one-third of the city chiefly its workers' districts in a single night. The USA bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki immediately alarmed the world: the future of mankind and nature were at stake.

All this is nothing new. Nevertheless, before the early 1960s nothing had been known of the fact that since 1942 the USA had been testing a radically new type of chemical weapons. It was intended for use not so much against people as against the environment.

In August 1970, condemning the crimes perpetrated by the US Army during its chemical war in Vietnam, US Senator Gaylord Nelson said: "The history of mankind has never known a case in which a country declared war against the environment of another nation; yet the United States embarked on an ecological experiment which no nation else dared undertake."

The USA had long been nurturing plans for waging large-scale ecological warfare and had been making intensive preparations to this end. The people of Japan were chosen as its first victim. At the close of the Second World War the USA was stepping up preparations to destroy all of Japan's rice crops so as to leave its people and army without food. Japan capitulated under the decisive attack of the Soviet Army—and foiled the plans of US military circles. The USA switched its ecocide weapons to combat national liberation movements, and against socialism-oriented countries. Their main blow was spearheaded against Vietnam.

The massive use of chemical weapons, unprecedented in the history of wars and continued for more than 13 years (including the use of herbicides by the Saigon regime), which had embraced almost a half of

South Vietnam and several provinces of Laos and Kampuchea, led to unpredictable changes in all the three spheres of the environment: biocenosis (fauna and flora), soil and water, climate.

This was the first time that the participants in the symposium had come up against such a host of new scientific and practical problems whose solution was indispensable for eliminating or in some cases at least localising the long-term consequences of the past chemical war. The scientists confined themselves to expressing general hopes for carrying on a comprehensive study of the complex sum total of the newly emerging ecological, medico-biological and other problems. Vietnam's problems drew special interest owing to the fact that many similar problems, only on a smaller scale, had emerged in the participants' own countries. Among them was the problem of accidents at enterprises that had manufactured products for chemical warfare in Vietnam. The point is that many US soldiers who had taken part in defoliating Vietnamese forests and destroying crops, or in action in contaminated areas, had also been affected by Agent Orange and dioxin. It also turned out that Vietnam's problems were closely linked with those of removing toxic chemical waste containing dioxin, semi-products formed through synthesis of Agent Orange and other similar toxins.

THE TRAGEDY OF VIETNAM

It is common knowledge that the scientifically founded application of herbicides and defoliants benefits mankind by raising crop yields and accelerating the renewal of forests. If used in concentrations hundred times exceeding the tolerable level for combat effect over large areas, these chemicals destroy the biocenosis and in the ultimate end are liable to cause a large scale ecological catastrophe.

The herbicides and defoliants used in Vietnam had an immediate effect on the country's natural environment: forests died, crops were destroyed, wild animals and cattle, birds and poultry, fish, amphibia, insects and even microorganisms perished.

The destruction of mountain and plain tropical rain forests cardinally affected the soil, the river regimes and even the climate in several provinces of South Vietnam. Mountain forests had protected the upper soil layers from being washed off by the heavy tropical rains. During the rainy season the undergrowth in these forests had retained much of the rainwaters in the soil helping restrain the force of the surface flow. In the dry season these "reserves" made up for the lack of water in nearby rivers and riverlets. Today when the rains come to these forestless areas torrents gush down unbridled from the mountains, while severe droughts set in there during the dry season.

In their final document the participants in the symposium came to the unanimous conclusion that toxic agents "sprayed on a large scale, at a high concentration, and in large amount, have changed the composition of some soils, destroyed useful microorganisms, and, in some instances, caused the soil to lose fertility and to deteriorate in other ways. Many areas which had been covered with trees and other woody plants have become savannas of low productivity. They contain only wild grasses or a number of secondary successional plants having little economic value, and support rodents which are disease carriers. Evidence from aerial photography and other sources indicates that some of these savannas are continuing to expand in size. Some species of valuable tropical wood are facing the danger of extermination, as are some precious terrestrial and aquatic animals. Transforming these savannas back to forest or building them into economic zones for agriculture presents difficult problems, the solutions of which are often far beyond the present abilities of the Vietnamese people. Moreover, all the employed means of affecting

nature have virtually undermined the country's life-supporting system." The chemical war has greatly affected Vietnam's mangrove forests, the chief natural spawning ground of saltwater fish and the home of valuable shell-fish used for food. The destruction of these forests has deprived the local population of their traditional food sources forcing many to leave these parts. The restoration of the mangrove forests has just begun and will take much time. The changes in the river flow regime, large-scale erosion and sedimentation, as well as toxic residues from herbicides, defoliants, dioxin and arsenic contained in the water and soil are liable to affect, and to no small extent, the fauna and flora of these forests' ecological system.

The US Army had used Agent Orange along with dioxin with which it had been mixed. In the course of the chemical war not less than 2,000,000 people, chiefly men, were affected by herbicides and dioxin. To this day the Vietnamese soil contains large residues of herbicides and defoliants, the different technological additives they incorporated, including dioxin, along with the products of their disintegration of the chlorophenol group. These toxic agents are carried by rainwater and groundwater to uncontaminated land and water areas, where they join the nutrition cycle and produce damaging effect. Today it is impossible to determine the exact number of people who have come into contact with the dioxin which has found its way into Vietnam's natural environment since the end of the chemical war.

However, dioxin produces effect through direct or indirect contact in exactly the same way and to the same extent. Dioxin is a highly toxic organic agent diversely affecting human organs and producing metabolic disturbances. Its teratogenic and cancerogenic properties manifest themselves in the human organism upon contact with the most miniscule doses of this agent. The Summary Report of Working group on cancer and clinical epidemiology came to the general conclusion: "There is a general consistency between the pattern of chronic toxicity induced in animals by dioxin and dioxin-contaminated chlorophenolic compounds and those observed in exposed human populations. Such toxicity includes: 1) chronic hepatitis; 2) disturbances in immune function; 3) disturbances in lipid and porphyrin metabolism; and 4) neurological abnormalities, sometimes associated with a toxic neurasthenic syndrome."

Medical statistics show that dioxin's toxic effects could be observed many years after ending of the chemical war and there is every danger that they will continue to recur. Thus, after the war the number of children with inborn deformities was ten times higher in South Vietnam, where Agent Orange and dioxin were used, than in North Vietnam, where they were not (4 and 0.4 per cent respectively). Examination of 956 families where the husbands had fought in the southern part of the country, and 593 families who had remained in North Vietnam and had no contact with dioxin, showed that in the South the number of inborn anomalies was 15 times higher and the number of miscarriages and premature births respectively 1.5 and 3.3 times above the figures for North Vietnam.

According to data supplied by a gynaecological hospital in Ho Chi Minh City the number of miscarriages in 1952 stood at 0.45 per cent, and from 1976 to 1979 retained the 11-20 per cent level. In Ho Chi Minh City the registered number of liver cancer patients increased 3.2 times as against the prewar period.

Scientists have noted that the character of changes affecting the genetic apparatus of Vietnamese who had come into contact with Agent Orange and dioxin has much in common with the chromosomal disturbances observed among the victims of the A-bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There are two large population groups in the world today

suffering from chromosomal disturbances: the survivors of the A-bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in Japan, and the victims of Agent Orange and dioxin in Vietnam. The crimes perpetrated by the US Armed Forces are responsible for the suffering of both these groups.

Victims of conventional weapons, from the bayonet to the high-explosive bombs, were injured or maimed in action. Their physical sufferings were all their own and were not extended to their progeny. The use of nuclear and chemical weapons affecting as they do the hereditary apparatus of the survivors of nuclear bombings and chemical attacks, has given rise to a new category of victims, one embracing their children, grandchildren and succeeding generations of their offspring. This is one aspect of the inhuman nature of mass destruction weapons whose banning is insisted on by the Soviet Union and peace forces the world over.

THE PENTAGON'S CHEMICAL WASTE DUMPS FROM AMSTERDAM TO NIAGARA FALLS

The production of chemical weapons holds no less dangerous prospects in store for people and their environment. Here are a few examples.

The Dutch firm Philips-Duphar specialising in the manufacture of toxic agents has set up a large number of chemical waste dumps in the marshy areas situated only 5 miles from Amsterdam. Thousands of tons of diverse harmful agents have piled up at these dumps, among them dioxin and the salts of heavy metals. And it is not by chance that of late cases of cattle sterility and poultry epizooty have increased in this area.

In 1963 during the explosion of a chemical reactor at one of the Philips-Duphar plants in Amsterdam manufacturing Agent Orange for the US Army, a toxic mass containing dioxin was ejected into the production shop and the plant's premises. Twenty workers from this shop and the inspectors investigating the causes of the explosion began to suffer from chloracne, a skin inflammation characteristic of dioxin poisoning. Three workers and an employee of the Philips-Duphar firm died two years later from lethal doses of dioxin. The plant was closed down.

In the first months after the explosion the firm's administration set its hopes on the natural ventilation of the premises and their decontamination.

Toxicological control was carried out with the use of test animals. The animals died or were affected with disease upon inhaling the polluted air or coming into contact with contaminated objects. It was reported that the walls of the shop were contaminated to a level exceeding permissible norms billions of times: each kilogram of plaster contained up to a gram of dioxin. The floor of the shop was to all appearances contaminated even more.

To decontaminate the shop, the plant's administration hired 100 workers. The operation was carried out from March to July 1963. Detergents and different alkaline solutions were continuously used along with great amounts of water to wash the walls of the shop. The effect fell short of expectations. At the same time the washing procedure carried off some of the dioxin into the sewage system leading to its contamination. Of the 44 workers taking part in the decontamination process who were examined in March 1964, 26 were suffering from chloracne. By 1977 all the 27 workers who had remained at the plant had specific skin disease typical of dioxin poisoning.

The Philips-Duphar firm was compelled to destroy the plant. The debris along with a part of the equipment and soil with a total weight of nearly 1,000 tons was loaded on three barges and sunk in the vicinity of the Azores in the Atlantic.

Fourteen years later, in July 1976, a similar disaster took place near Séveso (20 kilometers north of Milan in Italy), when a chemical reactor

exploded at one of the chemical enterprises of the Swiss firm Givaudan-F. Hoffmann-La Roche Co., sending large amounts of dioxin into the atmosphere. It contaminated a densely-populated area of some 20 sq km with a population of 38,000. Ten days went by before dioxin was discovered in samples of soil and vegetation and work was begun to localise the contaminated area and help the population. By the end of July the evacuation of the entire population from the zone with the highest contamination was completed.

All in all 77,000 animals, mostly rabbits, either perished or were destroyed for sanitary reasons. The high-contamination zone was declared "no-man's land". In the less contaminated areas crop and animal farming had to be suspended. The upper layers of soil were removed and replaced by soil brought from other areas. The contaminated refuse and soil from the danger zone were buried in an 85,000 cu m concrete and plastic "vault". Further examination of the area showed that although the land was ploughed up the concentration of dioxin in the soil was falling at an exceedingly slow rate. This poison was discovered in all plants grown in the contaminated zone, including carrots, potatoes and onions. It was also discovered in clinical materials taken from people who had remained in the zone during the first few weeks after the explosion.

To avoid deformities in new-born babies and different malfunctions in pregnant women, abortions were recommended to all expectant mothers living in the affected zone—an exceptional decision for a country with a mostly Catholic population.

And here are a few examples from the experience of the USA. The Niagara River with its famous falls marks the state border between the USA and Canada. The US city of Niagara Falls lies on the right bank of the Niagara River and has a population of 77,000. A few years ago it turned out that some of the city's districts were situated on ground covering a huge pool of water containing toxic chemical refuse, including dioxin. The discovery was prompted by numerous cases of cattle murrain and the perishing of birds and animals. Investigations led specialists to connect the increasing number of miscarriages and in-born deformities in the area with its possible contamination. It was established that out of 36 examined citizens 11 had numerous chromosomal aberrations. Mass evacuations were begun from districts with a high content of dioxin and other toxic agents in the waste products of local chemical industries. Houses were put up for sale. Selective soil tests showed that toxic agents had penetrated the subsoil waters and were threatening to poison the Niagara and Lake Ontario with all the ensuing unpredictable consequences.

Upon investigating the activities of the local chemical companies the New York State authorities found out that several dumps were sited within city limits, the biggest of them—in the Love Canal and Hyde Park districts.

At the end of the last century one William Love began building a canal between the Higher and Lower Niagara River. Although the work was later suspended he had succeeded in completing one-kilometre long and over 30 metre wide lock. The project remained unfinished. The open part of the canal, fed by the waters of the lake, had for many years supplied water to the swimming pools of Niagara Falls. In 1956 local residents began the construction of dams on the canal which divided the canal into several sections.

At the height of its production boom in manufacturing 2, 4, 5—T (a component of Agent Orange) the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation began to dump production waste in the Love Canal in the southeastern part of the city. Company data testifies that, 21,800 tons of chemical waste containing up to 200 diverse chemical compounds including dioxin and trichlorophenol were dumped in the canal waters. The

most modest assessment sets the content of dioxin in this part of the canal at nothing less than 5 kg, or 20 times the amount ejected into the atmosphere during the explosion at the chemical plant in Amsterdam.

A dismal record belongs to Occidental Chemical, a branch company of the Hooker Chemical. In the northwestern part of the canal running through the Hyde Park district it dumped 80,000 tons of chemical waste products, including approximately 2 tons of dioxin and 200 tons of trichlorophenol—source material used for the spontaneous synthesis of dioxin.

Of late charges have been brought against the Hooker Chemical and Occidental Chemical companies with demands to destroy the chemical waste products accumulated underground. The cost of decontamination work is expected to run into millions, and it will take years to complete. The residents of Love Canal and Hyde Park areas have brought private charges against the chemical companies to the sum of \$14 million. But can money compensate for the ruined health of those who had for years inhaled or consumed through food and water the poison produced by industries serving the needs of the chemical war in Vietnam?

OMINOUS ARSENALS

Tourists arriving in the international Stapleton Airport in the popular resort city of Denver (Colorado) cannot fail to notice the kilometres-long rows of barrels lined up not far from the airfield. A high fence runs the length of the blocks of chemical plants: this is the Rocky Mountains chemical arsenal of the US Army, and the barrels contain diverse toxic agents. The plants manufacture these agents and chemical ammunition.

The Rocky Mountains arsenal was set up in 1942 when it incorporated two plants specialising in the production of lewisite and yperite. Between 1952 and 1954 another plant was put into operation for the production of sarin, a toxic nerve agent. The arsenal's dumps were stocked with chemical and biological (bacteriological) weapons.

US authorities officially claim that the arsenal's chemical plants have been mothballed since 1967. In its time the Shell Oil firm had contributed to the activities of these military-chemical enterprises. On agreement with the US Army it had used the yperite plant's facilities for the production of trichlorophenol, Agent Orange and chlorinate biphenyls. In the 1960s the US Army destroyed in this arsenal's territory limited stockpiles of obsolete or defective chemical ammunition. The plants' waste products were also interred in its territory. The Rocky Mountains arsenal covers an area of 7,000 hectares which begins within Denver's boundaries near the city's business section.

According to the official version in the early 1970s, but actually long before that, birds stopping on the lakes located in the arsenal's territory for a respite during their migratory flights began to perish in large numbers. It was reported that chemical analyses had shown that the entire territory was contaminated by arsenic and mercury (the result of the former lewisite production), products resulting from chlorination and oxidation of yperite and its polysulphide compounds (residue left after distillation of yperite), chlorinated phenols and dioxin (the result of Shell Oil production of Agent Orange), as well as toxic substances yielded during the production of sarin.

In 1976 the US Department of Defense found it profitable to start preparations for closing down several chemical arsenals with the view of turning chemical weapons production over to private industry. The Rocky Mountains arsenal was declared to be the main project whose territories would be prepared for their contemplated transition for private needs. The first round of measures to clear its territory envisaged tearing down buildings and eliminating the interred waste products, or removing the upper soil layers on an area exceeding 1,000 hectares, and carting off for interment elsewhere of 12 million cu m of contaminated

debris and soil. The cost of this first round of measures envisaged for the next 15 years is estimated at \$357 million, and that of the entire operation at \$1,800 million.

The decontamination of subsoil waters in the arsenal's territory and the adjoining areas poses a special problem. The waste products cast off into cesspools and lakes have penetrated subsoil waters and toxic agents have been discovered in wells drilled outside the arsenal's territory. Water taken from these wells has poisoned animals. Contaminated by Agent Orange it destroys all vegetation and hence cannot be used even for watering crops.

The Colorado State authorities have brought charges against the US Department of the Army and Shell Oil. The defendants are now negotiating on how they will share the compensation for damages. To reassure the public the US Army and Shell Oil have "of their own accord" built three water purification plants along the perimeter of the territory which shed partially purified water into the city sewage system. This is, however, a purely symbolic gesture. Toxic waste has penetrated the subsoil water carrying layers to an extent that is beyond exact assessment. For hundreds of years or maybe more toxic waste will remain in the Denver resort.

These facts refer only to a small part of US territory contaminated by agents dangerous to man and nature. These areas, known as they to the public, can be compared to the insignificant, visible part of a floating iceberg. Its greater invisible part can be identified with the territories of all the US military-chemical arsenals and plants, chemical weapons depots, proving and exercise grounds where toxic agents are employed without exception.

Scientists have not yet fully assessed the potential danger for man and his environment of toxic waste formed in the process of destroying stockpiles of toxic agents. This concerns the solutions containing decontamination products and the remains of toxic agents which are produced in huge quantities during the chemical neutralisation of toxic agents. As a rule the decontamination of every 10,000 tons of sarin yields 250,000—300,000 tons of dangerous waste. Decontamination of yperite produces 3-5 times more liquid waste products. In what way does the Pentagon intend to inter the waste products synthesized in the process of destroying toxic agents? In the 1960s attempts were made in the Rocky Mountains arsenal to pump such waste into deep wells, an experiment leading to earthquakes in Denver. There is eloquent evidence that the Pentagon continues to dump toxic waste into the gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic waters off the northeastern coast of the USA.

The US militarists do not want to part with chemical weapons. Under their pressure, the NATO military bodies have recently decided to give the green light for the production of a new generation of chemical weapons—binary weapons and their storage in Western Europe. An attempt has been made not only to preserve the chemical threat to mankind for years to come but to intensify it. As was stressed in the Soviet Government Statement of May 31, 1986, such actions run counter to the task of eliminating chemical weapons and are at variance with the Soviet-US accords reached at the Geneva summit, such actions cannot but seriously affect the drafting of a convention banning chemical weapons being carried out at the Conference on Disarmament.

The Soviet Union, the other socialist community countries and all those really concerned with the future of the Earth resolutely condemn NATO's chemical rearmament plans. They persistently draw the attention of the governments of the USA and the other North Atlantic Treaty countries and the European countries to the extreme danger posed by these plans to the cause of peace in Europe and the rest of the world.

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

NORWEGIAN PAPER SEES 'POSITIVE SIGN' AT STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 3 Sep 86 p 2

[Editorial: "KNE as a Barometer"]

[Text] KNE in Stockholm--the Conference on Disarmament in Europe--is slowly becoming something more than a collection of initials among the many abbreviations which are a part of the daily language of diplomats and officers. According to the time plan, the conference will before 19 September present a series of recommendations for confidence-building measures which will contribute to control of arms and disarmament. It is a hugely laborious effort, with experts working through the details so that a possible agreement will be as "watertight" as possible--with as few as possible hiding places and empty phrases for those who want words and not deals.

Interest is now focusing on KNE because the delegations from both the East and the West have placed concessions on the table in the past weeks. The impression is now growing that there is a mutual desire for agreement on some limited results. It is not realistic to expect more from negotiations which are dealing with large military equipments. The Russians have met the West part way on the question of in-place inspection, and last Friday even the Soviet Chief of the General Staff appeared in Stockholm to state that Moscow has dropped its years-long opposition to inspection.

On the Western side the delegations from the NATO countries have agreed that notification of troop movements will also include transport across the Atlantic, and they have dropped the demand to inspect from the air with their own aircraft and pilots. Instead they propose that the aircraft should come from neutral countries, while the Russians continue to maintain that this is the job of the host country during inspections. This conflict gives an example of how important it is to clarify the details of a possible agreement.

It is a positive sign that concessions in Stockholm apply to such questions--inspection and notification--which can contribute to reducing suspicions between participants at the conference: 33 European countries, plus the United States and Canada. Thereby a number of East-West conflicts which are due to suspicion and insecurity can be disposed of, and we will remain with the classical conflicts of interest in a tug of war for power and influence in Europe.

The main task of the Western effort to reduce tensions the last 12 years has been to make this tug of war somewhat less dangerous and establish contacts across East-West differences which only an extended historical process can accomplish. KNE is a part of this process, and it cannot in itself change the national interests of the major powers. But it can be a very sensitive barometer for whether these powers consider that it is time to try some careful changes in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/2762

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

PRC PAPER ON ROMANIAN ARMS REDUCTION, CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

HK110439 Beijing RENMINRIBAO in Chinese 9 Sep 86 p 7

["Random Notes" by Sai Bei: "A Good Start"]

[Text] Romania plans to reduce its armaments and armed forces by 5 percent by the end of this year and thus makes a start in the disarmament of the two military blocs confronting each other in Europe. This is a good start!

Europe constitutes a strategic place in the rivalry between the two superpowers. The issue of European disarmament can be regarded as a crucial point in the world disarmament issue. The European disarmament conference has been held off and on for many years. However, in spite of the disarmament rhetoric, armaments have been expanded year after year. Controlled by the superpowers, the two military blocs distrust and are deeply suspicious of each other. Neither of them is willing to be the first to reduce armaments and troops. In truth, not only do the superpowers suffer from the heavy burden of military expenditure, but some medium-sized and small bloc members are even more anxious to reduce their military expenditures. However, none of them dares to take the first step to make a decision on arms reduction. Now Romania has boldly taken the first step. This is a very valuable step.

In my view, armed forces are indispensable to state security. However, this does not mean that the more armed forces a country has, the safer it is. A state's security also depends on whether or not it has a foreign policy of peace and a sound economy. If a country one-sidedly expands armaments beyond its capacity and beyond the toleration of the surrounding states and the rest of the world, it will, in all probability, bring insecurity, rather than security, to the country. For this reason, keeping a small but better army capable of meeting the needs of national defense is a wise measure. At present, although the situation in Europe is still tense, it is by no means explosive. Therefore, if other countries in the two blocs can voluntarily reduce armaments as Romania does, they will undoubtedly make a contribution toward easing the confrontation between the two major military blocs and the tense situation in Europe.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW TV: SOVIET, FOREIGN JOURNALISTS DISCUSS MORATORIUM

LD140750 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1120 GMT 13 Sep 86

[Special program "Arguments Against Prejudices"; roundtable discussion by Soviet and foreign journalists hosted by political observer Dmitriy Biryukov with Patrick Cockburn, correspondent of the London FINANCIAL TIMES; Nikolay Yefimov, first deputy editor in chief of IZVESTIYA; Peter Riese, correspondent of West German radio; and (Kazuo Kobayashi), correspondent of Tokyo NHK General Television Network; roundtable discussion held in the Central Television studios at Ostankino "slightly more than a week ago"]

[Text] [Biryukov] Good evening, comrades. Today, in one of the Central Television studios at Ostankino, representatives of several countries--correspondents regularly working in Moscow--have gathered to discuss some of the topical issues of the present-day in our contemporary world. Let me present Patrick Cockburn of the FINANCIAL TIMES of Britain; Nikolay Yefimov, first deputy editor in chief of IZVESTIYA; Peter Riese of West German radio; and (Kazuo Kibayashi) of the Japanese television company, NHK.

Let us begin with the most controversial question of today: the problem of the moratorium on all nuclear tests, which the USSR has now unilaterally extended for the fourth time. [Video shows Biryukov sitting at the far end of a table. To the left of him on the screen is Yefimov and Cockburn, with an interpreter seated next to him. To the right of Biryukov on the screen are Riese and (Kobayashi), both with interpreters.]

[Cockburn--in English with superimposed Russian translation] The principal reason why the United States has not joined the Soviet moratorium is that in pursuing its own interests, the United States wants to implement a program of nuclear tests until U.S. scientists come to the conclusion that the program has reached its objectives. The Soviet Union has extended its moratorium for the fourth time to the end of the year, but it is difficult to believe that even if the moratorium is extended further the United States will respond with a similar measure. Thus, the likelihood is that the moratorium will be halted at the end of this year.

[Biryukov] How does British public opinion see the Soviet Union's latest step?

[Cockburn] I work in Moscow, and it is more difficult for me to judge from here what the attitude of British public opinion really is to the extension of the Soviet moratorium. The majority of people in Britain do not consider that they can play an active role in the resolution of this problem. They probably see themselves as onlookers, albeit not indifferent ones, witnessing what is taking place between the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Yefimov] Patrick, you said that U.S. scientists are implementing some program of theirs. What, in your view, is this program, and what is the attitude to this program in Britain?

[Cockburn] As I understand it, the U.S. wants to complete the development of a new generation of their nuclear weapons. They assert that the Soviet Union already has nuclear weapons of this generation, and now they have to catch up. As far as public opinion in Britain is concerned, basically people are afraid of nuclear weapons in general. It seems to me that the average person in Britain is not aware of what types and categories of nuclear weapons exist and what programs are being developed in this area.

[Birukov] I should like to give one explanation and make one proposal, if I may. The way things have worked out, Patrick has to give replies, as it were, on behalf of the United States. Let me note that we invited our U.S. colleagues, but each one of them had some reason not to come to our meeting. Thus, we have concentrated our discussion on Patrick, and we shall let our other colleagues have their say in a moment.

But first, I have another question for you: How are you, as a Moscow correspondent, reporting our position, the proposals advanced by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the very frank and multifaceted data which are given at press conferences.

[Cockburn] The fact that there are no U.S. correspondents here does not mean that I have to present the U.S. position here, no more than I intend to represent the position of the British Government. But I shall try to be as objective as I can. On the question of what the British public knows about the measures being proposed by the USSR, the initiatives being advanced here and the programs being adopted here, and what the view here is on the problems of the elimination of nuclear weapons, my reply would be as follows: Ordinary people in Britain, as well as in the Soviet Union, I think, are simply afraid of dying, and they are sure that as a result of a nuclear war they could all die. But an explanation of exactly how they could die is not given fully. It is not explained to them whether the cause of their death will be missiles launched from submarines, land-based missiles, ballistic missiles, or some other kind, or whether it will be tactical nuclear weapons. But people want to know the details. I don't think you can find a country anywhere in the world whose people are informed about all the details of this subject. People are not well-informed on the, so to speak, personal consequences for everyone in the event of nuclear conflict.

[Biryukov] Then I have a question for you, if that is all right. Do you agree with Patrick that the public is badly informed in all countries? It seems to me that the Soviet press gives very broad information about the position of the sides on the most burning problems of the present-day.

[Yefimov] Yes and no. Regrettably, it is indeed the case that people are very badly informed of our initiatives in many Western countries. Recently, for instance, we published a lecture delivered by the well-known U.S. scientist Linus Pauling in Hiroshima on 6 August this year. And the title he gave the lecture was, "They Do Not Know the Truth." They refers to the Americans, and the truth is the Soviet initiatives, the Soviet stance on disarmament problems. He is a serious person, a well-known scientist. But something else also needs to be said: The Soviet initiatives are, albeit gradually and not straight away, nevertheless finding their way into the hearts and minds of many people, one might say millions of people. We know this from reports from our correspondents and from the letters we get from abroad, as well as reports from the Western newspapers themselves.

I should like to say a few words about my personal attitude to the moratorium, my understanding of the situation today. Kobayashi no doubt knows about this himself.

In the Hiroshima museum containing and displaying exhibits connected with the atomic bombing there is one exhibit that produces a tremendously powerful impression--three or four granite steps that used to lead to a local bank. On these steps, at 0845 in the morning on 6 August 1945, sat a Japanese woman. We do not know her age or name. Around this woman the granite melted, it even frothed up. The woman turned into ash; she was vaporized instantaneously, leaving on the granite the eternal shadow of a woman sitting on the steps.

When you look at this museum exhibit, terrible thought it is to call it thus, here is what comes into your mind: The woman sat and did not know what awaited her and all the people of Hiroshima. Today we know what can await us. And today, when Pershings, whose flight time is 6 or 8 minutes, have been installed--we do not know how long the woman sat there--but we know that this can happen in 6 or 8 minutes. If the program on which U.S. scientists are currently working--well, it is scarcely realizable, but if we imagine that suddenly it can be realized, then we shall be just 30 seconds away from a catastrophe.

Our moratorium is not just a moratorium. Agreement was reached in Geneva on improving Soviet-U.S. relations, accelerating ways of solving disarmament problems and preventing the militarization of space. The moratorium is an organic part of our initiatives. I must quote THE GUARDIAN, a British paper, which said: If we want to embark on the road of nuclear disarmament, sooner or later we have to halt nuclear tests. And the paper noted correctly that it is better to do it sooner. Our moratorium is also, if you like, evidence of our faith in the possibility of disarmament, evidence of our very serious attitude to the problem. If you like, it is our hand extended in goodwill, not just to the United States but to all nuclear powers.

(Kazuo Kobayashi)--in broken Russian, occasionally assisted by interpreter] I would like to say that I agree in part with your view, but in part I do not agree. Why do I not agree with you? Because the Japanese people are well aware of the stance of the Soviet Union on the moratorium. For example: When Mr Gorbachev spoke on television about the moratorium, our television company transmitted this live. This is how we report, and the Japanese people are well aware. So please be assured that the Japanese understand the view of the Soviet Union very well, and in connection with the moratorium, why the United States is not taking part in the moratorium. Because you have, between the Soviet Union and the United States, you are radically...[changes thought] there is mistrust. For example, we welcome very much the Soviet Union's moratorium. But how is one to resolve the problem of verification? [proverka] Just a few days ago, Academician Velikhov made a speech and said that it is perfectly possible to verify [proverit] nuclear weapons tests. But the United States says that there are doubts, that it is not so simple. We also welcome the installation of equipment in the Soviet Union and in the United States, but that is only on a purely scientific level--not on government level. So both you--the Soviet Union and the United States--bear immense responsibility before the whole world. They say that poor people do not understand the rich, and that the rich people do not understand the poor. But I fear that--we have particular feelings about nuclear weapons, we have gone through terrible trials--and I think that the Soviet Union and the United States, who have such vast numbers of nuclear weapons, who are able to kill all of mankind one hundred or more times over, I think that the responsibility of the Soviet Union, having such armament, and the United States is very great. Please, understand such sentiments from such a small country.

[Biryukov] One second, I will say a few words: I would like to add to what (Kazuo) said, one thing that, in my view, is fundamental, that we--here I am talking on behalf of the Soviet Union, and this has been said both in Moscow and, said by Marshal Akhromeyev in Stockholm--we agree to very practical monitoring [kontrol] arrangements, and in principle we accept a number of very important proposals made by the U.S. side. But I think that the value of our stance lies in the fact that we are advocating the banning of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and the U.S. side is always trying to divert us with talk about monitoring [kontrol]. Monitoring [kontrol] is a very important part of the issue, but only a part. In the final analysis the U.S. side is refusing to talk about the bottom line--about the banning of nuclear weapons, about disarmament, about implementing the program proposed by our side to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2000. That, in my view, is the nub of the matter. [A "yes" is heard in agreement, presumably, from Yefimov]

[Biryukov] Please, Peter.

[Riese--in German with superimposed Russian translation] Well, the problem is that when you talk about the U.S. Pershing missiles, which are deployed in Western Europe, and how their flight time is 6 to 8 minutes, do not forget that the population of the FRG and the other West European countries have the same feelings. There they know that the flight time of the SS-20 is measured

in the same scale. I think that over all these years the buildup of weapons has gone hand in hand with, so to speak, the buildup of mistrust in each other. And now these mountains of weapons have led to a further increase in mistrust. For example: the U.S. public thinks, with the Soviet moratorium in mind, that the Soviet Union does not really intend to attain any tangible results at all. Evidently, in the Soviet Union they consider that in developing SDI, the U.S. is not developing a defensive program, but that SDI is an offensive program.

[Yefimov] And it is not just the Soviet Union that thinks so. Six former U.S. defense secretaries made a statement saying precisely and clearly that SDI is preparation for a nuclear first-strike.

[Biryukov] Might I make one observation on what you said about the deployment of missiles: Let us not forget the sequence of steps--who was the first to deploy and who was the second to deploy. Unfortunately, a situation is developing in which NATO, or the United States, is forcing us to take retaliatory steps. This is mentioned in many of our documents--that it is we who are holding out our hand, we who are displaying a high degree of trust in the other side, including through the moratorium. And as you have touched upon, the question of the SDI program, it seems to me, is also a topic for discussion. All the more so since each of the countries that you represent has a well-defined stance.

[Riese] I agree with Patrick on what he said about the degree to which people are well-informed. The public is afraid of being killed by nuclear missiles. But at our level, we are quite incapable of judging what is really happening during the talks on nuclear disarmament.

[(Kobayashi)] May I...

[Biryukov, interrupting] (Kazuo).

[(Kobayashi)] Yes. In connection with the intermediate-range missiles, as a Japanese I would like to say something. You have said that the SS-20's will--the talks go on about--be reduced in number...

[Biryukov, interrupting] I did not say that, but...

[(Kobayashi), interrupting] No. I am talking I want to say more. Where will the Soviet Union take these missiles? We in Asia have very great doubts that as a result of the talks between Western Europe and the United States, an accumulation...

[Biryukov, interrupting] I understand. The stance of the Soviet Union has been stated that if agreement is achieved the missiles will be destroyed and not moved from Western Europe--from Europe to Asia.

[Yefimov] You know, several questions have been raised here to which I would also like to give a supplementary answer. Mr Cockburn said that the United

States feels that they are lagging behind us, and therefore they are trying to catch up. Well, this is a very well-known theme; we have been hearing it for 45 years. They created the first atomic bomb, and they were trying to catch up with us; they created the first intercontinental bombers, and they were trying to catch up with us--they were lagging behind all the time. But here are the facts: in the world today there exist 25 types of weapons of mass destruction. The United States was the first to create 23 of these types of weapons. If one is to speak of the arms race then we, to use chess terminology, always have the black pieces. We try to catch up, make responses in order to be at the same level. That is the first thing. We understand, of course, and Mr Riese is right in principle, that in the other direction the flight time is also 6 to 8 minutes. But look, we have undertaken the very solemn pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Chinese People's Republic has undertaken the same pledge. All of our appeals to others to undertake such pledges, also, have as yet had no results.

As far as distrust is concerned, indeed a vast amount of this has been built up. But the point is not that it is increasing but that we are losing the trust that we achieved in 1972-74. This is the essence of the problem: when the treaties that were elaborated with such hard work, which lay at the foundation of the path along which the process of detente could progress--when these treaties are declared to be defective, when they are being renounced, this scarcely promotes the strengthening of trust.

[Biryukov] Patrick, please.

[Cockburn] Let us go back one step. I think that there are always difficulties when discussing problems of nuclear disarmament because people do not want to understand the obvious gestures of distrust in spite of the fact nuclear weapons provide a real chance for each side to be destroyed by the stockpiles which already exist. One must not forget that an increase in the numbers of such weapons in the world is now taking place. They are possessed by the USSR, the United States, France, and Britain, as are the means for delivering them. It is horrifying that conditions could arise in which these weapons might be put into use and people could be killed.

It seems to me that when new types of nuclear weapons are developed, this is not so much a striving to increase one's military might but more a routine gesture of distrust. And, in my opinion, it is precisely here that one of the main difficulties lies in discussing the prospects for nuclear disarmament. The United States is now developing [razrabatyvat] new types of weapons. The Soviet side is doing the same. I admit that, indeed, the United States is developing new types of weapons, and I admit that the United States is doing it first. But I do not think that there is any difference in principle.

The fact that the USSR is continuing its moratorium is of great importance precisely because this is a gesture of great trust. Of course, it is easy to discuss how many minutes it will take for Pershings to fly from the territory of West Germany to Soviet cities, to Moscow, say, just as in the

opposite direction. But, in general, people in Western Europe do not think about minutes but about the actual chances of being killed. We should not get bogged down in details. And I do not think that we should overestimate the situation pertaining in the 1970's. For the USSR and the United States continued to compete with each other in 1972 and in 1974. And the period was characterized both by features of confrontation and by features of coexistence. And today we are seeking how far the game can go that was tried earlier, but now with new rules. It seems that things are not going too well. But one cannot say that nothing has been done in the past few years.

But if we return to the main theme of our discussion today, my position is as follows: Although I do not see the Soviet moratorium's leading to any positive achievements, as the United States will not join in for some reasons of their own, I still consider that the very fact of the existence of the moratorium is very important because people in Western Europe and in the United States can at least believe that the USSR is not intending to destroy them. These people in various countries do not understand the finer points of who is conducting talks and what they are about. The very fact of a reduction of the threat is important to them.

[Biryukov] Indeed, we are not going to discuss the details of nuclear disarmament. That is not our task. But in summing up what I have heard from you, I would like to ask you a question. You might have different attitudes toward the USSR and the United States, but a very real situation exists today: Our country has put forward a concrete program of disarmament and for achieving peace. The United States, as far as I know, has not put forward such a concrete program. Doesn't this program seem to you, from your point of view, an indication of our realistic approach to the problem of disarmament, and doesn't this permit Western public opinion to regard our country with more trust, with greater trust?

[Cockburn] You may feel that Western public opinion should trust you. But, in fact, to speak honestly, this is not so. Is this good or bad? I think that in the past 2 years the degree of trust in the USSR has increased, that the earlier distrust was a consequence of certain weaknesses in Soviet foreign policy in the 1970's and earlier. The point is that if the agreements reached at the highest levels do not enjoy the support of the public they cannot be in operation for very long. And this is an objective weakness of the SALT treaty and other agreements of those years. These were agreements signed by heads of state and their closest assistants, but they ignored public opinion in the West. Today, the policy of the USSR is considerably more open and counts on the understanding of the Western public. Therefore, in conditions where the degree of trust in the USSR has increased, if agreements are reached at the highest levels, they will be met with support among broad circles in the West. This support will be the only guarantee that agreements on eliminating nuclear weapons will be long-lasting and effective.

[Yefimov] Mr Cockburn said that it was totally unimportant as to who was the first to create all of these monstrous types of weapons. But it is very

important. Because behind it lies a very important thing: Behind it lies the pursuit for superiority, military superiority, over the USSR. The United States has always thought: just a little bit more and they will get there. When we did not have the atomic bomb, you may remember, the President said: Now I have a good stick for these fellows. In principle each President counted on the next spiral, on the next new type of weapon to put a stick into his hands. So it is not at all of no importance as to who was the first to create these. I think it is precisely this pursuit of nuclear, military superiority which lies at the basis of distrust and the exacerbation of the situation in the world. So, now when the SALT II treaties are being called defective, it is not just the treaties which are being called defective. It seems that in essence that the main principle on which these treaties were constructed is being called defective. They were constructed on the principle of equality for both sides, respect for mutual interests. And when, now, the United States says that they need to carry out and implement one more program, then in essence they are again trying to make a leap forward and achieve superiority over the USSR and to dictate their will. They do not hide this. This is said by the President, this is said by Weinberger; many people say this openly.

[Cockburn] Could I just ask you one question: Do you think that it is realistic for either side to achieve nuclear superiority?

[Yefimov] I would answer your question like this: We shall simply not allow this. We cannot allow this.

[Riese] I think that the question already includes the answer. Insofar as such a large amount of weapons has already been accumulated, neither side can count on achieving any degree of military superiority. And in the final analysis, it is an academic question. I think that you are quite right when you stress the importance of precisely who was the first to develop new types of weapons. This is important first and foremost, from the moral point of view. However, from the point of view of practical politics, it has always been the case that one side is the first to develop a weapon and there follows a response from the other side. Remember what happened with the SALT-II treaty. It encompassed, so to speak, the field of intercontinental missiles, and so the number of intermediate-range missiles increased, not being covered by the treaty. And so, when we are talking about the moratorium, or about any other kind of step directed toward peace, we must be aware that we have not yet reached the stage of development at which we can really say, stop! to any further arms race.

[(Kobayashi)] Mr Yefimov, you said that the Soviet Union does not permit military superiority over the Soviet Union. But this, from the point of view of a small country in the military field, is an extremely dangerous view. This is the logic of he who possesses nuclear weapons. We do not have them. And the cause of this I do not know, but both sides emphasize that they will not permit the superiority of the other, and nuclear weapons are always being stockpiled. From our point of view, this is a very dangerous idea, a very dangerous approach. In connection with this, the reason for which we welcome

your government's unilateral moratorium is, that it is not that approach, but the contrary. That is a unilateral matter, a unilateral act. So we welcome it. But this kind of approach, not permitting superiority over the other, is extremely dangerous from the point of the Japanese and of small countries.

[Biryukov] (Kazuo), note one thing: We are saying that we will not permit anyone to have priority over us, but neither are we striving to have this priority. And our program is directed toward destroying weapons, not developing [razvivat] them.

[(Kobayashi)] Yes. You stress this approach, but the United States does not believe in what you say, Right? They do not believe.

[Biryukov] They do not believe, but...

[(Kobayashi), interrupting] Why, why?

[Biryukov] We are taking practical steps, but they are not.

[(Kobayashi)] Yes, yes. And so, in connection with this, it seems to us that a summit between Gorbachev and Reagan is extremely important--for the atmosphere, for trust, and then the elimination of the approach of not permitting superiority over each other. So, from the point of view of small countries, we hope that once again there will soon be a meeting, and that measures of trust will appear.

[Biryukov] In my view, you are being unnecessarily modest. First of all, Japan is not such a small country.

[(Kobayashi)] No, I mean it is in the military field that Japan is such a small country.

[Biryukov] I understand, yes. But you know that in a few days it will be officially confirmed that Japan is joining in the Strategic Defense Initiative. Excuse me for going over to the attack, but I have to.

[(Kobayashi)] Why? Yes, I think that the Japanese Government will soon decide to take part in SDI research. But why is that? Where do we, the Japanese, live? Our territory is just one-sixtieth of the territory of the Soviet Union. And how many people live in such a small space? One hundred and twenty million people, packed together without resources, and without friendly relations with its neighbours--friendly relations with countries worldwide. The Japanese are well aware that they simply cannot live. Also, we have no resources, the territory is so small, so (?we cannot lag behind) in technological development.

[Biryukov] But your position is weak in that--and I'll try to give a very simple example--one country says to you: We will supply you with a door that no shell can penetrate; a second country says, let us destroy the cannons that can fire it. Which stance is the more logical? If you do not fire the cannon, then you do not need the door.

[(Kobayashi)] Yes. So I would like to ask: Why is the Soviet Union so strongly critical of Japanese, as they say, militarism? We spend less than 1 percent of all national income on the military, and only 6 percent of the budget.

[Biryukov] That is not the point. I do not intend to discuss with you the budget in percentages. I will give you specific facts: the entry into Sasebo of U.S. nuclear squadron; the ceaseless joint maneuvers; the buildup of the Self-Defense Forces; the visit of a military delegation headed by Mr. (Kurihara) to Washington; joining the SDI. I do not have enough fingers on the one hand. So naturally, proceeding as we do from a desire to have good relations with our neighbors on the eastern flank, we take a guarded attitude to these steps.

[(Kobayashi)] But why is there such a desire? This is in part a result of your stepping up your military might in the Far East and in the Asian area. So this is a kind of cat and mouse game.

[Unidentified speaker] A cat and mouse game.

[Yefimov] It seems to me we have gotten away from the subject we began with (Kobayashi) himself has said that nuclear testing is impossible or difficult to halt because reliable monitoring [kontrol] does not exist. So I should like to...

[(Kobayashi), interrupting] It is the United States that says that.

[Yefimov] Yes, the United States says that. Well, the United States says a lot of things, but not everything the United States says is wholly trustworthy. In the first place, many U.S. specialists, serious specialists, are of the opinion that there is no such problem. The situation in the world today is not the same as it was, let us say, 30 years ago. There is a huge network of seismic stations, 120 of them, in the world. And all of these stations represent a means of monitoring. That is the first point. In the second place, the neutral countries, specifically the "Delhi Six" have offered their services to, as it were, provide such monitoring within an international setting. We have given our agreement to that. And in the third place, finally, the United States is forever saying, Let us monitor tests. But we are proposing something else: Let us refrain; let us sign a treaty totally banning all tests, and monitor that. You need to install apparatus on Soviet territory? Go ahead! Please understand, we do not want to be deceived any more than the United States wants to. We are just as interested in monitoring. But today there exists both national and international means for registering. Well, even practically, if someone coughs in Nevada. [Laughter] I am exaggerating, of course, but what I mean is that all tests can be registered. So it is not about monitoring; the means for that exist. What is lacking is something else, and this something else is the chief thing. What is lacking is political will. And why is it lacking? I would say that is the main question we are discussing today. It is lacking because they want to

drag us into a fresh spiral in the arms race. And they want it for a variety of reasons: to wear us down economically, to achieve military superiority, so that as they see it...[changes thought] all of this is to their advantage, in political terms and so on. That is the essence of it.

[Cockburn] I can agree with you on certain points, and up to a certain point, as far as will is concerned. The United States is making no secret of their position as regards the moratorium. They are convinced that they do not need it at present. And overall their position is completely clear.

But let us now return to a discussion of the question, Can anyone achieve military superiority? Personally, I do not believe in such a possibility. Already back in the late 1960's both the United States and the USSR had enough ICBM's with nuclear warheads to destroy each other. And I do not believe that anything has happened since then that might change that pretty stable nuclear balance. Even so, the fact is that every couple of years some new kind of weapon has come along.

So why do I think that the idea of the SDI came along, and evidently other similar plans will come along, too? As I see it, military circles on both sides say: Aha! They have such and such a thing. We must not be left behind. In doing this, the military proceed from the worst case scenario. That is their job. The generals do not ask us whether we want war or not. They simply warn about what can give rise to the worst case scenario. That is the logic of the past 15-20 years, not to say of the whole postwar period. And the U.S. generals' latest word can serve as an example. They are saying: The United States can create a very sophisticated nuclear umbrella. But it seems to me that any person in his right mind can see that the SDI, the nuclear umbrella over the USA, is a fantastic idea supported by not a single serious scientist in the United States or any other country. Yet the possibility of this idea arising came about amid a general atmosphere of distrust between the United States and the USSR, in which each side was thinking: the other side might, at any time, do something that will give it superiority; for this reason, we too, so to speak, will have to seek some measures of our own.

So, understanding this and bearing it in mind, let us return to the starting point of our discussion: that of political relations between Moscow and Washington. If these relations improve, then it will become significantly more difficult for the U.S. military to obtain congressional support for allocations for any new kinds of weapons. In those circumstances, though we might not achieve disarmament, we might at least achieve a limiting of the arms race. As for the question of reaching deeper agreements for limiting the arms race, leading to both sides making concessions, in principle such agreement are possible. Though personally I am pessimistic in this regard.

[Biryukov] Excuse me. Allow me to use my position as chairman of this discussion to make one point clear: I do not recall a single statement by either a Soviet statesman or a military figure to the effect that victory in a nuclear war is possible, or that a limited nuclear conflict is possible. The

United States, though, is elaborating such doctrines, saying that nuclear superiority and nuclear victory are possible, that a limited nuclear conflict is a realistic possibility...

[Yefimov, interrupting] Forgive me. To put it briefly, the nuclear age in which we are living demands completely new political thinking for all countries. Thinking which...[changes thought] I would say that there are, so to speak, two main, key points in this political thinking: First, in the nuclear age security for one's own country cannot be achieved at the cost of someone else's" we either live together or we perish together. There is no other way. That is the first point. And second, in relation to any other country, any problem can be solved only on the basis of the principle of equality of rights. If these principles are observed then all problems can be resolved peacefully.

[Riese] But again...

[Biryukov interrupting] Just a moment. Forgive me. I put the question to Patrick, so let him answer, and then we will come to you.

[Cockburn] Indeed, there may indeed be generals in the United States who believe that a nuclear conflict can be kept local. But I do not believe that U.S. foreign policy as a whole is based on such a perception. Personally, I think the United States considers a large number of other considerations in building up nuclear weapons. I do not think this policy is determined by the certainty that they can achieve superiority over the Soviet Union. There can be very few people in the United States who believe that.

[Yefimov] Excuse me. I can quote something that was said by Weinberger. He said: If we carry through with SDI, then we shall achieve, or rather, we shall get back to, a situation where the United States had a monopoly with regard to the possession of atomic weapons.

[Riese] I am wholly in agreement with you: that it is necessary to try to think in a new way, to start thinking in a new way. But I should like to stress the point that things are made more complicated by the fact that we have to develop this new political thinking while sitting on top of a vast mountain of weapons which we have accumulated over 35 years, and with newer and more sophisticated technology making it possible to further develop such weapons.

[(Kobayashi)] I have a question: Over a year has passed since the Soviet Union declared its unilateral moratorium. The United States does not go along with you, does not follow it. With your new thinking, what measures will you find, what measures are you seeking, what measures will you take to make the total elimination of nuclear weapons a reality? What means will you use? Why do you think that the United States is not following your unilateral moratorium?

[Yefimov] Look, you are constantly heaping the burden of this on the Russians.

[(?Birjukov)] (?It should be dual).

[Yefimov] Yes, the fact is that we should not be the only ones interested in resolving problems affecting the whole of mankind, but you, too, and the Germans, and the British, and the French. We are indeed doing our part. For instance, I cannot recall a single year in which as many initiatives were put forward as our country has undertaken this year. And let it be said, serious initiatives that are sincere and grand in scale. So, we are doing our part; it is your turn now.

[(Kobayashi)] But the facts are that the United States is not showing any intention to...[falters, apparently searching for Russian word]

[(?Birjukov)] If it does not join soon [words indistinct].

[Yefimov] Time will tell. Let us not go in for guessing. There is still some time to go to the end of the moratorium. And incidentally, when you said the United States does not believe words--perhaps I misunderstood you--but if what you had in mind was the moratorium, well, the moratorium is not words; for 13 months now we...[changes thought] there has been silence at our atomic test sites. That is not just words. That is a definite, if you like--I beg your pardon, it was no easy matter for us to embark on the moratorium. We were taking a certain risk. I hope that the world will correctly evaluate the step we took and react in a worthy manner.

[Birjukov] Esteemed colleagues. There is no more time for any of us to speak at this meeting, so I have the following suggestion to make: Given that we have not discussed all the issues today, not by a long way, and that, as I see it, our conversation has been constructive and interesting, and we have things to talk about and are able to exchange opinions, I suggest that we hold another meeting, and perhaps not just one more. Thank you.

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CSO: 5200/1581

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

FRG PAPERS COMMENT ON EXTENSION OF SOVIET TEST MORATORIUM

Gorbachev on the Defensive

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 21 Aug 86 p 1

[Editorial by Guenther Nonnenmacher: "Gorbachev's New Offensive"]

[Text] Since he took office Gorbachev has succeeded in giving the Western press the impression that there has been a qualitative change--not just a superficial change in personnel--in Soviet political leadership. The head of the Kremlin knows how to represent himself to the public (precisely this hopeful public) as a politician who is interested primarily in "internal reforms" (which is always translated in the FRG as "liberalization") and disarmament agreements. The nearly forgotten historic fact, on the other hand, is that no one advances within the party in the Soviet Union based on good intentions; one reaches the top only with decisive hardness and an iron will. Like no other Kremlin leader before him Gorbachev has managed to strike the right chords in terms of influencing the public in the opposing camp. Since he countered the American president's SDI proposal in January with his own suggestion for the creation of a "world free of nuclear weapons," he has succeeded, after once gaining the propaganda initiative, in maintaining it with a whole series of suggestions.

Gorbachev's new offensive must also be seen in this connection. He could hardly have found a better time to announce that the Soviet Union would extend its ban on nuclear tests until next year. Since August 6, when the first one-year moratorium expired, the West has been waiting in anticipation to see what the Kremlin would decide. There were already rumors in the media that the Soviet Union was preparing a new series of tests, when there came Gorbachev--as a kind of last-minute bringer of peace--and announced the extension. It is also apparent that the general secretary, in making this chess move, had waited for the results of the deliberations of the U.S. Congress. Arms expenditures are also not exactly popular in the United States and it was to be expected that the Senate and House of Representatives--under pressure to reduce the budget deficit--would order cuts on this point. It was also known that the congressmen in Washington--in contrast to the government--sympathized with the idea of a putting a stop to nuclear testing. Following the successful outcome of this strategy, Gorbachev did not lose a single day--his immediate thrust struck the American president at a weak point. This--in addition

to the technical objections to such an agreement at the moment--is also one of the reasons for the quick and snappish "no" of Reagan's spokesman.

Another reason is also obvious. An answer to the question of whether Gorbachev's various disarmament suggestions are more than tactical and propaganda chess moves can only be provided at the negotiating table--in Geneva and elsewhere. The experts there, however, have long seen a contradiction: Gorbachev's publicly announced flexibility as opposed to unmoving, hardline top Soviet negotiators. Within the past few days, however, there have been indications that--in view of the meeting between the foreign ministers in September which in turn is to serve as preparation for the "summit"--even the experts are seriously getting down to the "crux of the matter." It would have been appropriate for Gorbachev to have made his suggestion a topic of these negotiations. His most recent attempt to exert influence on these secret talks by using "public diplomacy," when viewed against this background, must evoke indignation and create new mistrust.

Despite all these reservations and objections, however, it should not be overlooked that positive statements can also be found in the Kremlin leader's speech. For one thing there is the belief, expressed as a foregone conclusion, that there will be a meeting with President Reagan this year. One could see in this statement an indication that Gorbachev is backing off of earlier demands for "preconditions"--especially regarding the dogma, steadfastly maintained up to now, that SDI be a part of the negotiations. To be sure, the suggestion to concentrate summit discussion on the possibility of a nuclear test ban agreement is also aimed at preventing tests related to strategic defense research. However, the fact that SDI is no longer mentioned specifically indicates a certain softening of the Soviet position.

Secondly, Gorbachev has emphasized that the Soviet Union is prepared to accept monitoring within its own borders. This question still accounts today for the greatest contrasts between Moscow and Washington. It is a positive sign and surely no coincidence that in harmony with Gorbachev's speech there was a visible attempt to come closer together on this point at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament Measures for Building Trust (KVAE). It is still a long and rocky road from declarations of principle to concrete agreements but the simple fact that this road is now being looked at is noteworthy in and of itself.

Gorbachev's speech shows--despite all objections with regard to methods and content--that a meeting with the American president is still probable this year. That it could produce a "major compromise" is, however, an illusory expectation. But there is room for some small progress.

U.S. Pressured on Test Ban

Bonn DIE WELT in German 20 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Rose-Marie Borngaesser: "All on One Card"]

[Text] Almost no one was surprised when the head of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, in his two and a half hour televised speech on

Monday evening announced that the Soviet Union would once again extend its unilateral moratorium on any kind of nuclear testing, this time until January 1, 1987. This message had already been expected following expiration of the August 6, 1986 deadline twelve days earlier; following the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviet Union cannot permit itself to conduct nuclear tests so soon, or at least they cannot admit that they are conducting nuclear tests. It would do terrible things for their image.

Moreover, the Soviets--unlike the Americans--long ago completed their test series. An empty propaganda ploy, then, is what they are dishing out, and the American government also lost no time in pointing this out.

If anything about Gorbachev's speech was remarkable it was how long it took him to get to the crux of it. It took a full 30 minutes for the Kremlin leader to justify his position on the moratorium. A tone of entreaty pervaded his long-winded speech. It did not sound as energetic and firm as before. This was not the speech of someone who held all the cards. Behind his defensive global phrases of justification, Gorbachev allowed the face of the loser at the Geneva summit conference to show through. That is where the SDI project remained untouched; that is where the agenda on arms control questions was expanded to include human rights problems and crisis areas like Afghanistan and Nicaragua.

Nevertheless, however, the Kremlin leader skillfully used his efforts at justification and scored some dialectical points in his own personal propagandistic manner. His totally irrelevant comparison of the Chernobyl catastrophe and the "Challenger" accident, however, obscured this rhetorical propaganda fireworks.

During his television appeal, the top man in the Soviet Union took the opportunity to respond indirectly to Ronald Reagan's letter without breaking the confidentiality agreement between the two superpowers. Gorbachev spoke again about the problem of chemical warfare and the chemical-free zone, and drew attention to the Stockholm discussions. And as if it went without saying, he declared again the willingness of the Soviet Union to submit to controls and inspections related to disarmament questions. In this respect the Soviet Union some time ago made a public and total reversal after years of refusal, or so it would appear at first glance--actually, the obstacle now as always involves details which Moscow objects to; the discussions on this crucial point are still going nowhere.

At the same time Gorbachev again tried to isolate the U.S. government from the opposition and the United States from the rest of the world. He again pulled out all the stops regarding war and peace, referred to his diverse "peace offensives"--beginning in January of this year and ending with his appearance in Vladivostok. And since the suggested nuclear freeze is popular all over the world, the Soviet general secretary skillfully used this advantage to draw the "militarist group" surrounding the U.S. president (which in his opinion is responsible for all the mischief) offside; his interlocutor himself comes off well. Gorbachev thus asks for the trust of the Third World and the group of six states under India's leadership; he quotes sources in NATO countries and appeals to like-minded skeptics in the United States itself.

The interesting thing about this attempt once again to place sole blame on the U.S. and cast it in the role of villain is of course that for the first time a Soviet leader is appealing publicly not only to those opposed to Washington's policies throughout the world but also to those within his own country who oppose his policies.

This opposition within his own country--those opposed to disarmament and those opposed to the Soviet system naturally were not mentioned--was no doubt always present, but Gorbachev discusses them for the first time--and mentions them in the form of "worried" letters which he receives every day; letters whose authors are asking about the security of their own country. He ably appeases them with a reference to the entire rest of the world.

Also remarkable about this television appearance of Gorbachev's is the fact that he is already firmly counting on his trip to Washington for another summit conference and is thus anticipating a positive result at the impending foreign ministers' conference in September.

Gorbachev is pressing far forward with this extra step. He is playing a calculated game, because this time he cannot return to the Kremlin with empty hands. Therefore, he also dramatically expressed the "historical opportunity" for him and Reagan to sign an agreement on a bilateral test ban.

But as always, behind the ringing words concerning disarmament and peace was the "vision" of inducing the Americans to give up SDI. Or as the Kremlin strategists more clearly state it--abandon development, testing and deployment of the SDI system. SDI means a great deal to the Soviet Union--that is why this time in America Gorbachev is betting it all on one card.

Gorbachev Expects 1986 Summit

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Aug 86 p 4

[Editorial by Josef Riedmiller: "Gorbachev Needs a Success"]

[Text] As recently as last week Ronald Reagan no longer had doubts about a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev this year; and also last week the top official American and Soviet arms control specialists met in Moscow. Their publicly announced task was to prepare for the Washington meeting between the president and the general secretary. There is still no "concrete result" to which the Kremlin leader can point in order to prevent suspicion at home that his meetings with the man in the White House are nothing more than elaborate idleness

But whether the president's answer on July 25 to the series of suggestions made by the Soviet party head satisfied him or whether the results of the meeting of the experts made him optimistic--on Monday he turned directly to the public on television and told them the situation with regard to Soviet-American relations. They are not good, and Gorbachev even made an effort to give the impression that he distrusts American policies more than ever before. His announcement to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing--which the Soviet Union has upheld for more than a year and twice extended--until the end of the

year is therefore not to be seen as an advance on trust. Gorbachev believes, rather, that the chances are good that he can also force Washington to halt nuclear testing.

Three factors appear to support his view--firstly, the growing support for a moratorium in the United States itself which took concrete form in the decision of the House of Representatives to prohibit underground testing after January 1, 1987--with the exception of smaller explosions of less than one kiloton of TNT--if the Soviet Union also holds to the test ban; secondly, the fact that several U.S. allies, including the FRG, favor the test ban treaty; thirdly, a worldwide, growing movement to end all nuclear testing for military purposes. Even the immediate refusal of a moratorium by the White House spokesman did not spare the United States Moscow's propaganda pressure. Rather, it forced Larry Speakes to explain in detail why America was not accepting Gorbachev's invitation. Their nuclear weapons had to be further modernized, he said, so that they could remain a "key factor" in terms of deterrence. In other words, the United States will only declare a moratorium when other questions of arms control and Soviet-American relations have been clarified.

Gorbachev on the other hand would like the test ban treaty to be the "prologue" to new agreements in the area of arms limitation, whereby he is particularly interested in defeating Reagan's SDI missile defense project which would not be able to be realized without further nuclear tests. To come closer to this goal was the only reason the Kremlin leader once again extended the moratorium without making American reciprocity dependent on his summit meeting with Reagan. Had he wanted to create a */conditio sine qua non/* [in italics], he would have expressed himself much more clearly than he did. For Gorbachev a test ban treaty would be the most desirable of all results but it is not a condition for holding a second meeting with the president--this time in his own country.

The conclusion should not be drawn, however, that agreements in other areas can easily take the place of the test ban treaty. There is scarcely any doubt that Gorbachev must also resist internal opponents of the moratorium. Before he announced the extension, he built up to it in a lengthy explanation to the Soviet people of what led him to this decision. And he pointed out the fact that it had been made by the politburo */and/* (in italics) the government. It may be just a trick when the Kremlin leader quotes letters from worried citizens who see the safety of the Soviet Union threatened, but in and of itself that is no reason to assume that the leadership in Moscow will continue to keep still past December if the Nevada desert continues to quake.

Gorbachev himself exposed the dilemma he faces when he said he would not allow himself to be intimidated or forced into "unnecessary expenditures." Since the political reputation of the party leader depends not least of all on the success of his economic program, he wants to avoid another round of the arms race. He would have to go along with it, he said, but would then lose the opportunity to fulfill his promises. The population is already beginning now to awaken from its dream of uninterrupted supply. His trip to the Far East in July gave Gorbachev an idea of how far he still is from his goal of putting the slow-moving economic and bureaucratic apparatus into a higher gear. The

repercussions of the reactor accident in Chernobyl are also still being felt in terms of new evacuations, transfers of personnel and general unrest; and recently fellow communist states have been called upon for assistance. That the Kremlin leader will find some respite is credible. The question is how far he can go in convincing others of this intentions.

'Grand Compromise' Seen Unlikely

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 20 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by Werner Adam: "Gorbachev's Test Ban Policy Holds Risks for Himself. Even Before New Summit, Party Leader Anticipates Results"]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Aug--The political advantages are greater than the military disadvantages, was the recent public statement by Marshal Achromeyev, chief of the Soviet general staff. His evaluation, be it out of conviction or party discipline, was of the moratorium on nuclear testing which party leader Gorbachev, following expiration of its first 12 months, has now once again extended. If one is looking for a motive for this step, at least two are apparent. From Moscow's point of view the unilateral halting of nuclear testing has up to now achieved rather good publicity internationally, while at the same time permitting the not unfounded hope that beyond this publicity an added incentive could be given to the opponents of American plans for a space-based missile defense system. And since the United States makes no bones about the fact that precisely because of this program a nuclear test ban is not being considered on their part, Gorbachev may in the long term view his constant appeals directed at America's President Reagan as the only feasible and available lever he can use against what is officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Not Realistic

After his most recent speech about further extending the moratorium, however, the question arises as to whether the Soviet party leader might not be in danger of overplaying the hand which he actually or supposedly holds. The reasons for such considerations are two statements which do not even appear to correspond to reality and which also scarcely provide a common denominator for his own reservations with regard to the policies of the United States: "The Soviet Union is convinced that an agreement to halt nuclear testing will be reached quickly and will be able to be signed as early as this year at the Soviet-American summit conference. This event would doubtless be the real main result of the conference at the highest level and a significant step along the road toward ending the arms race."

On the one hand Gorbachev is treating the possibility of another meeting between him and Reagan as if it were already a certainty and as if the meeting would without a doubt take place yet this year. Up to now his confidence had not taken him quite so far. On the other hand, however, he is already anticipating a "result" for which Washington itself has said it cannot find enthusiasm. Has the party leader thus created an indissoluble link or even established an ultimatum-like precondition which could allow Gorbachev himself and not so much the American president a sufficient amount of negotiating room?

Does he not run the risk of coming home from this summit conference with the knowledge that he simply miscalculated and had to accept the fact that there was no way to "deal" with Reagan? To put it another way, would he not then stand before his politburo and before the Soviet public like a man who backed down in the face of those people who were then and are now made somewhat uneasy by his numerous breaches of arms limitations?

In view of his tactical skill, about which there is scarcely any disagreement, the search for answers to these questions could lead one to assume that the summit preparations in the form of constant contact between Moscow and Washington would long ago have led to agreements which are however still being kept confidential. Opposed to this assumption, which alone would explain Gorbachev's public display of confidence, in the meantime, is nearly everything else that the experts on both sides who are handling the preliminary negotiations have implied. It can also not be explained based on the public statements of these experts regarding the subject of a "test ban," because in this regard in particular the viewpoints appear to be unchanged and uncompromising. And to complete the incongruities surrounding the situation, the general secretary himself in the same speech put a damper on his own optimism.

Criticism of America

As he indicated to his fellow countrymen and to the rest of the world once again, there is in the United States a "right-wing military group" which is "simply crazy with regard to matters involving the arms race." The objective of these representatives of the "powerful military and industrial complex," he said, is threefold: to ensure their profits from weapons production, to provide their country with military superiority and to "economically drain and politically weaken" the Soviet Union. This in turn would explain in any case, he said, the foreign policy course being followed by the United States which is bent on underestimating the Soviet Union, overestimating its own potential and thus, in addition to "technological self-confidence," arriving at the belief that they can allow themselves to do anything politically. At the same time Washington even goes so far as "to ignore even the concerns of its own allies and its own people."

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the politburo and the government could count on "unanimous support" from the people, said Gorbachev, without explaining further how such unanimity is determined. Instead, alluding to the United States, he gave express assurance that, "We know who we are dealing with and that is why the security of our nation is sacred." In any case, he continued, the Soviet Union will know how to meet every American challenge, "including the notorious SDI." To hope that Moscow could be induced to make "useless expenditures" in this regard is a miscalculation. "If necessary we will provide an answer that the United States does not expect. However, it will be an answer which will make the Star Wars program useless."

"Two Tragedies"

Having thus supposedly soothed his own military and political "hawks" in the Kremlin, the party leader then added a series of appeals for "reason and understanding." He tried to convince the United States of their common

interests by comparing their "two tragedies" under one and the same heading of "nuclear technology in the space age": the death of the Challenger crew in America and the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. And from these two very different disasters and their causes he concluded that they had illustrated in drastic fashion the dangers of using atomic weapons, because experts had calculated "that the explosion of the smallest nuclear warhead corresponds to the radioactivity of three Chernobyls."

The vacillation between threats and appeals, as has become typical for Gorbachev's frequent speeches, this time once again characterized his speech directed at Reagan. The pressure he is bringing to bear on his American counterpart with the moratorium policy which he has now raised to the level of a "moral commandment," could very well turn against him at the next summit conference at the latest. But until then several months will still pass. For now, the bustling party leader on Tuesday began his vacation, leaving not just the soothesayers in Moscow with plenty to chew on regarding his intentions, expectations and options.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER SAYS U.S. APPROVAL FOR ZONE VITAL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 10 Sep 86 p 5

[Text] "It is hard to imagine a 'nuclear-free zone' being implemented without the sympathy and cooperation of the United States," said Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland in an interview in the Danish newspaper POLITIKEN. The interview also states that a zone can only be developed if there is a change in NATO's strategy and that it assumes corresponding concessions from the Soviets.

"We must clarify what this (defense plans without the use of nuclear weapons) will require in the way of confidence-inspiring measures and agreements and how it can fit into a broader European context. But it is quite clear," the prime minister stressed, "that this cannot be done through unilateral declarations. Zones must be set up as part of agreements between East and West, for there must be balance in a result that should be part of a broader European security arrangement."

When asked what consequences a nuclear-free zone would have for agreements on stockpiling arms, Gro Harlem Brundtland said:

"The stockpiling agreements are based on conventional defense involving relatively short distances. Like the rest of Norway's defense, it is not planned as a nuclear defense, but it is part of the alliance strategy in which nuclear defense is included as a possibility in connection with a crisis or war.

"A future Nordic nuclear-free zone can only be developed as part of strategy changes and it must be based on agreements concerning specific geographic areas."

The prime minister confirmed that the Labor Party will consider strengthening conventional Norwegian defense if a nuclear-free zone becomes a reality. She pointed out that Norway has increased its defense budget by 3 percent every year in compliance with a resolution NATO passed on the matter in 1978.

"A number of other countries have failed to do this," Gro Harlem Brundtland told POLITIKEN reporter Professor Erling Bjøl.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SWEDISH FOREIGN POLICY EXPERT ON NORDIC NWFZ AKE SPARRING

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 8 Aug 86 pp 56-57

[Article by Ake Sparring: "A New Proposal from Sweden: New Impetus for a Nuclear-Free Northern Europe Through 'Trade'"; first paragraph is SUOMEN KUVALEHTI introduction]

[Text] The Nordic countries would actively engage in trade through their nuclear-free status. The reality of the current situation could be "traded" for concessions, our author, Ake Sparring, the former director of the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute, proposes.

The nuclear-free Northern Europe project has come to a standstill. Right now probably only the Danish Social Democrats are working on it.

We will not hear anything from Oslo before Norway's parties have found a new basis for their security policy. Sweden has not yet recovered from its shock over the submarines. Credibility in the Soviet Union is still low there and its government does not at this time want to be troubled with disputes over security policy.

In Helsinki, on the other hand, we are of the opinion that the political conditions for initiating discussions on the zone have so far been lacking. Iceland does not want to participate in these plans. Icelanders are above all disturbed -- and for good reason too -- by the increase in war vessel movements in that area of the sea between Iceland and Norway.

The idea that studies on the realization of a zone made at the Foreign Ministry by officials might achieve a breakthrough is utopian.

Security policy experts are reacting to the present quiet period calmly. Among them there is only a little support for the zone. The chief exception is Finland.

Some "ordinary people" now view the zone as a big, "tangible and very understandable matter," as former Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund recently said.

Some in whose opinion the zone is a tangible matter certainly believe that nuclear weapons pose no more of a threat in wartime than they do in peacetime. This is the way many no doubt think. I have, however, not yet come across a single leading Nordic politician, still less so an expert, who thought that Northern Europe could remain an inviolable area if a nuclear war should break out. This wedge between those who lead and those who are led, between expectations and possibilities, has rendered discussion impossible. This is also one reason why we have been getting nowhere on the matter.

A pity, because any arms control we can possibly achieve is important for us. We might buy a commitment for the Nordic countries to remain nuclear-free by gaining concessions and commitments from others, not just through promises to respect a zone.

Many Proposals

The notion of a nuclear-free Northern Europe will soon be 30 years old. Many plans have been presented. All of them have one feature in common: Nuclear weapons should not be stationed in the Nordic countries. Whether Iceland and Greenland would be included in the zone is still uncertain.

When Soviet Premier Nikolay Bulganin proposed the idea in January 1958, he had in mind a nuclear-free zone of neutral European nations, one greater than Northern Europe. He did not have in mind that the inhabitants of the area should enjoy special privileges.

In the plan proposed by President Urho Kekkonen in 1963, the zone is a Nordic affair. The Nordic countries would agree among themselves that nuclear weapons would not be stationed in their territories. Thus in peacetime Northern Europe would become a stabilizing factor. Kekkonen scarcely entertained any illusions as to what the value of the zone would be in time of war. It is to be noted that Sweden had not at that time committed itself to nuclear-free status.

In the 1970's Kekkonen amended his plan with guarantees to be given to the zone nations. The superpowers were to guarantee that they would not use nuclear weapons against or threaten zone nations with them. Whether Kekkonen believed that his plan would then also work in wartime has remained shrouded in the veil of history. It does not seem likely to me. Kekkonen is a man who has never entertained illusions.

In the other Nordic countries Kekkonen's proposal for a long time merely gave rise to confusion. As for the Soviet Union, it supported it. It was hard for the Danes and the Norwegians to understand why they should jeopardize the support of their allies just for the sake of a promise. In any event, the zone would have meant a change to a situation that would have remained stable for a long time.

When Norway, Sweden and Denmark's position entirely unexpectedly changed in the 1980's, the Nordic zone was linked with a contemplated nuclear-free corridor that would run right through Europe. The Norwegians were quick to point out

that this idea would not involve Kekkonen's plan. Indirectly, this meant that the Nordic zone as such seemed to be of secondary importance.

This sudden change was only ranting in many circles. Soon they were also really squabbling over how the zone could be realized. Those who doubted or were cautious wanted to wait until a major, common European pact was produced. The impatient ones wanted to immediately enter into negotiations. In their opinion, Central Europe and the Balkans would in this way get the kick in the behind they needed.

The cautious ones won out.

Clearcut Demands

Unlike Finland, the Scandinavian countries imposed clearcut demands on the Soviet Union. Soviet nuclear weapons aimed at Northern Europe were to be removed from the border zone. Anker Jorgensen, who had opposed the idea from the start, demanded that the Kola Peninsula also be included in the zone.

When we think of the strategic importance of the bases located on the Kola Peninsula, we can easily understand why Jorgensen wanted to end the whole discussion.

Sweden demanded that the zone include the Baltic too. Its demand was not as unreasonable as Jorgensen's, but the Soviet Union would not agree to it under any circumstances.

At first, the Soviet Union rejected all the Scandinavian countries' demands and it did not make any real concessions on the Baltic. It was in hesitant ways stated that certain concessions on surface-launched nuclear weapons would be possible. Moscow probably regarded the demands presented by the Nordic countries as being unrealistic. First of all, even Nikita Khrushchev had at the time stated that the Nordic countries could also be fired on with those missiles that are based deeper in the Soviet Union. Then too, as the Soviet Union itself said, it is easy to move nuclear weapons removed from the zone back into it.

Moreover, the Soviet Union is right. According to Finnish investigator Thomas Ries, the Soviet Union has stationed 1,350 nuclear weapons near the zone which can be fired on Sweden. But even if they were removed, as would undoubtedly happen if a pact were signed, the situation would not change much. There would still be enough nuclear warheads to make Sweden and the rest of Northern Europe uninhabitable.

The Americans, the English and the French have for a long time now pointed out these facts to their allies in Denmark and Norway. The Soviets can offer us only a few words written on paper — as long as concessions involve only nuclear weapons.

Moscow Wants Guarantees

Soviet military interests in a nuclear-free Northern Europe are both general and specific. Their objective is to wage wars as far inside Western Europe as possible. In Scandinavia the Soviet Union would rather wage war without nuclear weapons because, according to studies conducted by the Voroshilov Academy, the terrain favors conventional weapons. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would have complete superiority in conventional weapons in Northern Europe.

We may assume that the Soviet Union is even now quite satisfied with a situation in Northern Europe in which there are no nuclear weapons. It is hard to imagine a situation in which the Swedish Government would undertake to reconsider development of its own nuclear weapons. It is just as hard to imagine Soviet troops' posing such a threat to Denmark and Norway that those countries would call on their allies for aid. I do believe that whether Northern Europe continues to be nuclear-free or not will depend entirely on the Soviet Union's own behavior.

But Moscow will probably in any event want binding guarantees on our nuclear-free status. They feel that their own security requires these guarantees.

We in Northern Europe also require a kind of security that nuclear weapons have nothing to do with. We cannot do anything about the fact that the Soviet Union can destroy us with missiles fired from Central Asia. This possibility must be removed at the discussions on nuclear weapons being conducted in Geneva.

However, we could devote more attention to the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional weapons in Northern Europe. This would also be consistent with the Soviet Union's own policy, since First Secretary Gorbachev some time ago proposed that the military alliance forces in the different territories be balanced.

For the sake of balance, a nuclear-free zone pact will require a step-up in conventional weapons or -- which would be preferable -- a reduction in the kind of Soviet weapons that are suited to waging war against the Scandinavian countries. During the past few years the Soviet Union has been producing more weapons suited to surprise attacks. These weapons have upset the military policy balance in the Baltic area and the Nordic Arctic.

Map Tells the Truth

With the exception of Iceland, the armed forces of all the Nordic countries are based on universal military service. The dread they create is indeed considerable when full mobilization is effected. Troops are, however, notably slowly mobilized and this is why the Nordic countries are suitable targets for surprise attacks.

We would have to negotiate our nuclear-free status. In practice this would mean that certain kinds of weapons and troops would have to be eliminated --

for example, long-range fighter planes and amphibious troops — and that certain kinds of maneuvers would no longer be permitted.

Unlike pledges to respect our nuclear-free status, this would be an appreciable improvement in our security, yet it would not weaken the Soviet Union's security.

Furthermore, the nuclear-free zone would in this way be linked with the Stockholm conference and the CSCE process. The so-called NN Committee, which Sweden and Finland are also members of, is in operation at the Stockholm conference. It has demanded that countries that organize maneuvers announce in advance whether they will be using "particularly threatening kinds of weapons or equipment." By this they mean specifically airborne and amphibious troops. Let it be noted that the Soviet Union has not rejected this demand.

The advance warning is, of course, only one step forward. A nuclear-free zone will mean reductions on both sides.

One need only cast a glance at the map to see that a zone protected from surprise attacks must also include Poland and the GDR. And this should not be viewed as a weakening of Northern Europe. The four Nordic countries — Iceland should not be alluded to in this context — do not form an exclusive strategic unit. It is a shorter distance from Malmo and Copenhagen to Moscow than to Hammerfest. Copenhagen's closest neighboring capital city is not Oslo or Stockholm, but Berlin.

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CSO: 5200/2743

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

CONSERVATIVE NORWEGIAN PAPER ATTACKS GOVERNMENT NWFZ POLICY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Aug 86 p 3

[Commentary by Lars Hellberg: "Unilateral Nordic Zone Discussions Can Undermine Norwegian Security"; first three paragraphs are AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Text] The government's active movement toward a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone is the clearest confirmation so far of the Labor Party's security policy slide over the past five years. For a long time the Labor Party has celebrated Jens Evensen's dramatic solo presentation of October 1980. Today this party platform plank has become official Norwegian policy.

Thereby we have entered a situation in which we are cheerfully discussing the question of eventually going out with declarations about the Nordic countries as a nuclear weapon-free zone without waiting to see what happens in the negotiations between the superpowers, and regardless of our relationship with our western allies.

The Nordic foreign ministers were rightly satisfied to agree on how to examine the question, but that is happening without expecting any Soviet concessions as to the nuclear weapons which threaten Norwegian targets. If this development continues it will weaken both our position in NATO and the Nordic balance.

The Nordic countries are free of nuclear weapons. The problem is, to say it carefully, that there are nuclear weapons in our near vicinity. What we can expect in the way of concessions from that quarter was summed up by the well-known Soviet commentator Jurij Komissarov in wonderfully clear phrases several months ago:

"The Soviet Union is a nuclear weapons power. It is therefore wrong to place special demands on the country merely because certain parts of its territory border on an eventual nuclear weapon-free zone." So we know that. It is no less interesting that at the same time he complained that the Willoch government made the "Atlantic and NATO arguments its own."

Broke the Rules

That results, as is known, from the facts that we belong to the Western alliance, and we have the world's largest military base, the Kola Peninsula, as our nearest neighbor. Until the Labor Party broke the rules of the game Norwegian foreign and security policy were also based on consideration of these realities. Norway has not become any less dependent on primarily American assistance than it was when Evensen's solo performance shocked Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund.

New Assumptions

The assumptions of the zone debate between the Nordic countries have, however, fundamentally changed as a direct result of the shift by the Norwegian Government, to quote the Finnish Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen. Here at home it looks as though the Conservative Party could be standing alone in its belief that it is "an unalterable assumption that all zone work in relation to other countries must take place with the understanding of our allies and with their cooperation." In any case, the Labor Party has abandoned the line which was supported in the security policy agreement formulated by the Storting Foreign Policy Committee. The agreement excluded unilateral Nordic discussions as a first step on the way to a nuclear weapon-free zone.

It does not come as a surprise, but it is still an unwelcome confirmation of the party's slide. Information secretary Magne Barth of "No to Nuclear Weapons" is entirely correct in saying that "the Labor Party's platform contains totally clear formulation of the zone."

Evensen

If we go back to the national congress of the Norwegian Chemical Workers' Union in 1980 the entire turnabout is clear. When Jens Evensen launched the proposal for a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries as a "positive first measure in Europe to create a reduction of tensions and introduce new elements in the work for disarmament," this came as a shock to the then Labor Party government.

Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund's reaction was ideally clear:

"I am personally disappointed at Ambassador Jens Evensen's statement, and I do not understand why he came forth with this proposal just now, especially since he could have conferred with me about his ideas and thoughts. This action is going to influence the personal relations between Jens Evensen and me in the future."

At that time Frydenlund, who was then on Finnish soil, clearly emphasized Norway's obligations to see the question of a nuclear weapons-free zone in relation to our obligations as a member of NATO. It is these obligations which caused the Norwegian Government Officials' Committee under the leadership of Ambassador Kjell Colding to draw the following conclusion:

"A nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic countries can first come after a broader European arrangement has been established with significant reductions of both nuclear weapons and conventional forces on both sides of the East/West dividing line in Europe to the lowest possible balanced level."

Unilateral

Now the Labor Party is claiming that there is not necessarily any conflict between discussing different, hypothetical possibilities for setting up a zone and our obligations in NATO. But it is more important how others interpret the new orientation of our domestic Social Democrats. The goal of our Finnish friends, who have agitated for such a zone for more than ten years is clear enough; it is just as clear as their understanding of the Labor Party's changed viewpoint:

"The Nordic countries, or at least Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland, must first agree among themselves on establishing such a zone. Then other states, through their own actions, can improve the conditions for setting up zones," it says in an official Finnish report.

Neutrality

In the best case such a course of action will be an attempt to liberate the zone question from the broader security policy debate. In the worst case a Nordic government officials committee will be seen as a first step on the way to neutrality.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR PAPER: U.S. ACTIONS CONTRADICT WORDS ON DISARMAMENT

PM091102 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Sep 86 First Edition p 3

[A. Mozgovoy "Commentary": "Saying One Thing"]

[Text] Everyone is concerned today about the problem of banning nuclear tests. The vast majority of politicians, public organizations, and ordinary citizens in various countries support the USSR's stance and resolutely favor halting the tests. The U.S. President expressed his viewpoint in an interview for the Mexican paper EXCELSIOR. "Ultimately we all want to completely rid the world of nuclear weapons," R. Reagan said. "But we do not share the view that the moratorium on nuclear tests really contributes to this.... The question of a ban will arise when we do not have to rely on nuclear deterrence to safeguard international security and stability and when a broad, deep, and verifiable [podkontrolnyy] arms reduction has been achieved...." That is, the President is all for a ban on nuclear explosions, but only after substantial steps on disarmament....

But is the U.S. Administration striving for disarmament? Alas, no. This is shown in particular by the following events in the United States in the past month:

The United States carried out the 13th MX first-strike strategic missile test. The components of the first series MX missile were delivered to the Francis E. Warren military base in Wyoming. After assembly it will be placed on alert status....

During breakfast with representatives of the U.S. press, new U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch announced that work had begun on the modernization of 131 B-52 bombers in order to equip them with cruise missiles. When this bomber becomes part of the strategic air force in 3 months' time the United States will exceed the limits on nuclear warheads laid down by the Soviet-American SALT II Treaty....

An F-15 fighter from Edwards Air Force Base in California launched an antimissile missile at a designated target in space. Then the Pentagon announced its intention to conduct a whole series of similar tests in the very near future....

There was a ceremony at the General Dynamics yard in Groton to commission the submarine Nevada, armed with Trident strategic missiles. President Reagan's close friend Senator Paul Laxalt attended the celebrations. He called submarines equipped with Tridents "instruments of peace"....

Of course, the White House incumbent and his retinue are free to call brand-new offensive armaments "custodians," "guarantors" or "instruments" of peace. But this sleight of tongue is not going to deceive anyone. The present U.S. Administration has no desire at all for disarmament, but is endeavoring to accelerate the insane arms race.

Incidentally, more and more U.S. citizens are coming to realize this. During the commissioning of the Nevada hundreds of demonstrators chanting "Stop Trident!" arrived at the gates of the General Dynamics yard. They lay down on the sidewalk, thereby demonstrating that further buildup of the lethal arsenals would lead to irretrievable catastrophe. Another group of antinuclear movement activists in boats tried to get into the area of water belonging to the yard. "Test peace, not weapons" the demonstrators chanted. They demanded that the U.S. Administration take the first step on the path to disarmament and join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions.

This development was not to the liking of the organizers of the militarist ceremony. The police were summoned. The "guardians of law and order" threw 12 demonstrators into jail. They will appear in court soon. The peace fighters will face a charge of "violating public order and trespassing on private property."

But how does all this square with the U.S. President's statements about wanting disarmament? It doesn't at all! It is a matter of saying one thing and doing another. Clearly this policy is considered acceptable in Washington.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET PAPER CRITICIZES U.S. DETERRENCE DOCTRINE

PM111547 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 3 Sep 86 p 3

[Own international observer G. Dadyants article answering reader's questions under the rubric "Dialogue with a Reader": "War Is Not an Arm of Policy"--first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] We are continuing our dialogues with readers on the most important problems of world politics. SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA international observer G. Dadyants replies to questions from L. Sambek (Moscow City), scientific official at the AllUnion Scientific Research Institute of Medical Instrument Making.

[Sambek] In his statement on Soviet TV M.S. Gorbachev noted that old ideas about war as a means of achieving political ends are outmoded. How is that thesis to be understood?

[Dadyants] In the sense that in the nuclear age obsolete dogmas sustain a policy which could lead to a universal conflagration. The modern world, where masses of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons have been accumulated, has become too fragile for wars and strong-arm policies.

Of course, as long as imperialism exists there will be a threat of war and a desire on the part of the imperialist states to resolve political disputes by military means. We recall that in the nuclear age the United States has waged wars in Korea and Vietnam, carried out military intervention in Grenada and military interference in Lebanon, and launched a piratical attack on Libya. Now it is waging an "undeclared war" against Nicaragua. But nuclear weapons have not been used in any one of these wars. This is because the danger of nuclear war is understood even where governments continue to consider war an arm of policy.

The fact is that a nuclear war is simply not the kind of war that was possible in the past. In the event of a nuclear conflict all human civilization would be threatened with ruin. That obvious truth is impressing itself more and more deeply on the peoples and sober-minded politicians in the West. Hence the conclusion that the main problem facing mankind today is the problem of survival. It is on this theoretical premise that the Soviet Union's foreign

policy is based today. Objective and honest analysis of the realities of the nuclear age requires new approaches to world politics, a new understanding of the present level of civilization's development, and a fundamental break with many customary ideas and traditions of political thinking, including views of the problems of war and peace.

[Sambek] Western ideologues claim that the postwar peace has been maintained only because of the existence of nuclear weapons and that they are a factor in "deterrence" and, consequently, in the maintenance of peace. What is the difference between the "balance of terror" formula and our formula of equal security?

[Dadyants] The Western doctrines of "containment" or "deterrence" are primarily immoral because they turn the whole world into a nuclear hostage. They are also groundless because the nature of present weapons leaves no hope for any state of defending itself with purely military-technical means, however powerful it may be.

Second, "deterrence" doctrines encourage a further arms race since they are based on a desire for military superiority. Currently, for instance, the United States is hoping to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union with the help of the "star wars" program.

Unlike the inherently aggressive Western doctrines of "deterrence" and "containment," Soviet military doctrine is purely defensive. We believe that the present level of balance of nuclear potentials is too high and does not ensure security for the two sides but poses an equal danger to both of them. The continuation of the nuclear arms race will constantly increase this equal danger and could boost it to a level where even parity would cease to be a factor in so-called "deterrence." Genuinely equal security can be ensured not through building up nuclear and other arms but through ensuring balanced reductions in them--in other words, by way of an extremely low rather than a high level of strategic balance from which nuclear and other types of mass destruction weaponry would have to be totally excluded.

Thus, for us the task of ensuring security is a task which can only be resolved through political means. It is at this that all the Soviet Union's peace initiatives are aimed.

[Sambek] Various types of "radio voices" constantly harp on about the "aggressiveness" of our foreign policy. They also claim that our peace initiatives are no more than "propaganda" aimed at "sapping the vigilance" and "splitting the unity" of the West. What can you say on that score?

[Dadyants] It would be hard to expect any kind of objectivity, much less new political thinking, from "radio voices" created during the "cold war" to suit its needs. Foreign policy is always an extension of domestic policy. The real aims of Soviet foreign policy are best demonstrated by our large-scale economic and social plans.

It is true that ruling circles in the United States and other NATO countries try to depict Soviet peace initiatives as propaganda, but we might well ask why they themselves do not engage in such "propaganda." Why, for instance, are such a large number of riders tendered with regard to the Soviet plan set out in M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January statement to rid mankind of nuclear weapons by the year 2000? Why is the United States refusing to join our unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, which we have extended several times now?

Now for the so-called "unity" of the West. In putting forward our large-scale initiatives, we are by no means aiming to split that notorious unity. That unity, incidentally, is split above all by dissension among the capitalist powers. And if the Soviet proposals result in additional friction among the Western allies, that is not the USSR's fault. It is first and foremost the fault of the United States, which pursues such as adventurist course in the international arena that it is not even always supported by its allies.

[Sambek] Western propaganda very often claims that we are pursuing a policy of peace because we are unable to arm ourselves and ensure the country's socioeconomic development at the same time. In particular it is said that this is why we do not want to agree to Reagan's "star wars" program. Is there a grain of truth in that?

[Dadyants] There is a grain of truth only in the fact that we really do not want to waste funds senselessly on an arms race. Needless to say, this race--imposed on us--not only serves to provide super profits for the moneybags of the military-industrial complex and to prepare for war. It also has other immoral political goals. Including the desire to economically exhaust the Soviet Union, wreck our party's course of further improving the people's living standard, and hamper the implementation of our social programs. But the arms race is exhausting its initiators too. One need only recall the astronomic sums (to the tune of trillions of dollars) that the U.S. national debt has reached. Immoral aims with regard to the USSR turn into immorality with regard to the American people. It has been not us but they themselves who have had to cut back on social programs.

As for President Reagan's "star wars" program, economically it does not scare us. "Nor should people count on using this area," M.S. Gorbachev said, "to scare us or propel us into unnecessary spending. If necessary, we will quickly find an answer--and not the answer expected in the United States. But there will be an answer which will render the 'star wars' program worthless."

[Sambek] To what extent does the "survivability" thesis dovetail with the theory of socialist revolution and the inevitable victory of socialism as a social formation on a global scale? And do not the principle of confrontation between the two systems and the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems contradict each other?

[Dadyants] President Reagan once said that if extraterrestrials landed on earth, the United States and the USSR would quickly find a common language and join forces to repulse them. But a nuclear conflict is far more fearsome than an attack by imaginary aliens. Hence the survivability thesis. This has nothing to do with the theory of socialist revolution, since revolutions develop independently of interstate relations as internal class contradictions mature. Unlike capitalism, which tries to stop the march of the historic process by force, we have never of our own volition linked revolution with war.

Of course, the confrontation between the two systems will continue. But under the circumstances of the nuclear threat objective conditions have emerged in which this confrontation can take place solely and exclusively in the form of peaceful coexistence and peaceful rivalry. The terms "coexistence" and "rivalry" are not contradictory, they stem logically from each other under the conditions of prevailing nuclear parity. In other words, it is our conviction that the question "who will defeat whom" should be resolved in the political and social sphere rather than on the battlefield.

Hence yet another important conclusion. The prevailing situation in the world persistently requires the organization of constructive, creative cooperation among states on a planetary scale. For instance, the need for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation is clearer than ever in the example of East and West Europe, which complement each other.

The real dialectics of world development lie in this combination of competition, historic confrontation between the two systems, and the trend toward the interdependence and collaboration of the world community. It is through the struggle of opposites, the 27th CPSU Congress noted, that the contradictory but interlinked and largely integral modern world is formed. On the basis of the concept of this integral world the congress drew up the principal foundations for the creation of a comprehensive international security system.

[Sambek] Nonetheless, how is the imperialist world to be made to follow the new political thinking? Surely if we are thinking in the new way while they are thinking in the old way, nothing will come of it.

[Dadyants] The capitalist world can only be made to adopt the new political thinking by the real course of events in the international arena.

Under powerful pressure from public opinion U.S. ruling circles have already been forced into certain concessions--agreeing to new approaches to a number of highly important international problems. If you recall, M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with R. Reagan in Geneva reached agreement that a nuclear war should never be unleashed, that there could be no winners in one, and that the sides would not strive to achieve military superiority. But words, of course, must be reinforced by deeds.

We recall that the nuclear disarmament program worked out at the 27th CPSU Congress was defined as fusing the philosophy of a secure world with a platform of specific action. It is through specific action and deeds that the Soviet Union is striving to achieve a turn for the better in the development of world events. Such a specific action was the extension of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, announced by M.S. Gorbachev in his 18 August statement. The widespread approval expressed by world public opinion for this bold political step on the part of the USSR and the active campaign launched worldwide to end nuclear tests should, we believe, influence official Washington's position. An agreement to end nuclear tests could be signed this year at a Soviet-U.S. summit--if, of course, such a meeting takes place. It would undoubtedly be a significant step along the road of ending the nuclear arms race and a prologue to further constructive talks, to a radical improvement in the international atmosphere, and to a world without wars or weapons.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR MILITARY PAPER ON PEACE MOVES, DEFENSE NEEDS

PM091408 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 86 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "A Sacred Matter for Us"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's impassioned call for all nuclear tests to be ended is resounding around our planet these autumn days. This call is dictated by a sense of supreme responsibility for the fate of human civilization, over which hangs the real threat of nuclear annihilation. The Soviet Union's extension of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987 was an act of enormous state wisdom. This truly historic step is organically linked with the whole range of constructive proposals made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries aimed at eradicating the threat of a new war.

This is not the first time the Soviet Union has appealed to mankind's reason and conscience. The 27th CPSU Congress formulated the foundations of a comprehensive international security system. The Soviet proposals of 15 January this year concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide by the year 2000 wholly accord with the demands of the time. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states have proposed a range of armed forces and conventional arms reduction measures in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. [paragraph continues]

The Soviet Union has put forward an extensive platform for ensuring security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. The planet's progressive public has made a high assessment of the foreign policy initiatives of the USSR and the other socialist community countries, which make it possible to curb the destructive arms race and save the earth from nuclear ruin.

How have those at whom these constructive Soviet proposals are primarily aimed responded? How are those circles in the United States, through whose fault the arms race is not diminishing but gathering pace, responding to the Soviet appeal to Americans' reason and dignity? The series of nuclear tests in Nevada is the response to the more than year-long silence at Soviet nuclear test ranges. The growing militarist activeness in many parts of the world is the West's response to the socialist states' peace initiatives. The large-scale NATO "Autumn Forge-86" exercises are being held in direct proximity to the borders of the socialist community in Europe. An American armada numbering around 30 ships -- aircraft carriers, a battleship, missile cruisers, and nuclear submarines -- will hold major maneuvers in the Sea of Japan in September. They will be an overtly provocative show of force near Soviet shores. The list of such actions aimed at undermining security in the world could be continued. Imperialism is trying to surround the USSR and the other socialist countries in a ring

of military bases. The United States has over 1,500 military bases and installations on the territory of 32 states. There are more than 500,000 U.S. servicemen permanently stationed at them. The forces of reaction and militarism, not wishing to eschew their old thinking, are continuing to hope that they will exhaust the Soviet Union economically, weaken it politically, and ultimately win commanding positions in the world and carry out their long-standing imperial ambitions.

Vain calculations. Imperialism's dangerous foreign policy is built on false premises. Its inspirers clearly underestimate the power of the economic and defense potential of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and at the same time overestimate their own potential. The love of peace shown by the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community is by no means dictated by weakness. It stems from an awareness of their lofty responsibility for mankind's fate. But we do not place the struggle for peace and vegetarian pacificism on the same level. As M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has stressed, "the country's security is a sacred matter for us. That must be clear to everyone. It is a question of principle."

We know with whom we are dealing. Imperialism has repeatedly tried to resolve the historic dispute with socialism by military means. The foreign military intervention in the first years of Soviet power, the Hitlerite invasion... Yes, history teaches us to be vigilant. An example for the present armed defenders of socialism are their fathers and grandfathers, who fought courageously for the motherland's freedom and independence and for people's right to work peacefully in their own land. And now that the imperialist states are rejecting our peace-loving proposals, stepping up their military preparations, and openly proclaiming the course of eliminating socialism as a social system we must ensure that the untiring struggle for peace continues to be organically combined in our policy with a readiness to give a firm rebuff to any aggression. This requires high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the socialist motherland from Soviet people and Armed Forces servicemen.

The USSR Armed Forces are developing as an integral part of the combat community of the socialist Warsaw Pact armies. The strengthening of the fraternal armies' unity and their preparation for jointly defending socialist gains will continue to be a most important factor in maintaining world peace and strengthening the peoples' security.

The military threat posed by imperialism dictates the need for constant concern about socialism's defense potential. This also conditions the need for constant and purposeful activity by commanders and political workers and party and Komsomol organizations to foster in Soviet servicemen the highest political and military vigilance. This work must be conducted constantly. Its organization requires special attention during tactical exercises, flights, and sea voyages. It is important to use all forms of work to strengthen the awareness of each serviceman that through his military labor he is helping to enhance the motherland's might and strengthening the cause of peace.

Now, at the end of the academic year, all efforts of the armed defenders of the motherland must be focused on the dogged struggle to further improve ground, air, and sea training. Every effort must be made to ensure full and high-quality fulfillment of the plans and programs of combat and political training and socialist pledges. It is also important to always remember that success depends on constant concern shown to strengthen discipline and maintain strict regulation order.

It is well known that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are the main target of the imperialist states' intelligence services and foreign subversion centers and organizations. Their hostile activity aims to undermine or weaken the socialist countries' social and state systems. These are vain ventures! But their intent cannot be ignored. That is why we must be intolerant of any ideologically harmful manifestations and any hesitations or vacillations which might promote the class enemy. It is necessary to constantly conduct active offensive counterpropaganda work, to purposefully mold selfless devotion to the party cause, communist ideals, and proletarian internationalism in all Soviet servicemen, and to foster in them deep ideological convictions, high political and military vigilance, and a readiness to defend socialist gains. The motherland's security is a sacred matter for us. Soviet servicemen will spare no effort to strengthen it. Surrounded by nationwide concern and guided by the Communist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces will continue to vigilantly stand guard over our fatherland's peace and security.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRAVDA REPORT ON SECURITY TOPICS DEBATE WITH U.S. ACADEMICS

PM110938 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Sep 86 First Edition p 6

[A. Ivkin report: "To Survive Together. And Not Just That! Dialogue of Soviet and American Scientists"]

[Text] "...The conviction that the very existence of the human race is at stake and that it is time for decisive and responsible action is asserting itself increasingly strongly in the awareness of peoples throughout the world and of political and public forces of very different orientations and world outlooks. This conviction demands the utmost mobilization of reason and common sense," M.S. Gorbachev said in his 18 August statement on Soviet television.

The desire of representatives of different sections of the international public to conduct a dialogue to mobilize reason is a sign of our times, which are full of dramatic events. Meetings and conversations lend a human, personal aspect to state relations. And such was the conversation, a record of which is offered for our readers' attention, at a "roundtable" meeting of the Soviet scientists B. Marushkin (USSR Academy of Sciences General History Institute) and G. Mikhaylov (USSR Academy of Sciences Scientific Council on the Comprehensive Problem "History of the Great October Socialist Revolution") and their U.S. colleagues (D. Kedi), professor of philosophy at Hamline University (St Paul, Minnesota) and (J. Kankl), professor of philosophy at the University of Dayton (Dayton, Ohio).

B. Marushkin: Einstein spoke long ago of the need for new political thinking in the nuclear age. It is impossible to "get on" with nuclear weapons. We are approaching the point where war could break out not even through the ill will of politicians or military men but by accident. People are tired of living in fear of the threat of a nuclear nightmare. How can they get rid of it?

You know of the Soviet proposals aimed at improving the situation in the world and at disarmament. They include both partial and global proposals, formulated in the program for phased disarmament by the end of the present century and backed up by perfectly specific actions such as the moratorium on nuclear explosions. You also know that the USSR has advanced the thesis of the need to restructure political thinking in accordance with the realities of our age. All peoples face the threat of a nuclear apocalypse. The interdependence of the security and survival of all countries is the starting point for our concept of the new political thinking.

(J. Kankl): I have no objections to this approach to the problem. The point is, however, that awareness of the need to change thinking is coming up against obstacles that are difficult to surmount. Some are traditional, extending back into the mists of time, while others are engendered by our times and by ideological differences. Marxists rightly believe that public consciousness does not always keep up with reality.

(D. Kedi): Let us take our two countries. Between them there exists the problem of mutual understanding or, rather, mutual misunderstanding. When friends learned that I was going to Moscow, they looked at me as though I "was not all there" and feared that I would be...arrested here. Many of our people think that your peace proposals are just a cover for preparations for war. All the more so, as the President also claims this. You realize what a gulf there is when even clever people are subject to such ideas! [paragraph continues]

They can be overcome with the help of broad, mutual contacts and study of our people's languages, history, and culture. I believe that Soviet citizens also have an inadequate picture of the American people and of society and life in the United States.

G. Mikhaylov: You say that we travel too little to each other. But I would like to remind you of the fable of the man who went abroad and saw frogs, midges, and other trifles; there, but did not see an elephant. Is everyone able to draw the correct conclusions from what he has seen?

(D. Kedi): Much here depends also on what people show. When contacts take place only on official grounds, you are left with the feeling that they are not revealing something important to you. We have a phenomenon called "civilian diplomacy." Having visited a certain country, people endeavor to report what they have seen: They write in newspapers and magazines, speak on the radio, and address meetings. Many of the Americans who have visited the USSR are helping to spread positive views of your country even during the present difficult times.

In recent months, it seems to me, Americans generally have been more kindly disposed toward the Soviet Union thanks to your peace proposals. Our character is impressed by the persistence of your "peace offensive." The unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions is particularly popular.

(J. Kankl): Yes, the moratorium has played a very favorable role and given members of the antiwar movement in America still greater grounds for demanding that the President hold a constructive meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev and reach an agreement on nuclear disarmament. I believe that public opinion in America will play an increasing role in solving this problem. Congress, for example, cannot disregard it, for there are elections in November...

B. Marushkin: The development of contacts on a public level also depends on changes in the echelons of power. They open or close doors. On the other hand, public appeals to heed the voice of reason are addressed to decisionmaking politicians. In my opinion, our politicians are opening this door wider than others. No one has undertaken so many constructive confidence-building initiatives as our country's leadership. The Soviet moratorium comes from the arsenal of new political thinking.

G. Mikhaylov: But here is an example of the old, "prenuclear" and "prespace" thinking in politics. I mean the U.S. President's recent speeches, in which he declared that he will on no account abandon the implementation of the "Strategic Defense Initiative."

(D. Kedi): Many people in America also advocate international security. But opinions differ as to how to ensure it. We have pluralism. The President believes that it will be furthered by an ABM "umbrella," although it is no accident that his idea has been called the "star wars" program. This idea, too, is very unpopular among scientists. However, the machinery of our democracy is such that; if the voters voted for Reagan and he considers it necessary to implement SDI, it is difficult now to alter anything.

B. Marushkin: Are pluralism and democracy good when they bring "hawks" to power and, with them the threat of a universal catastrophe? Would our people support a foreign policy other than a policy of peace and cooperation? No, and the party knows it.

Let us return, however, to our theme. What can we scientists do to solve the problem of world security? [paragraph continues]

I am pleased with the work of our and American seismologists, who are conducting a joint experiment to monitor [kontrol] nuclear tests and have already demonstrated its efficiency.

(J. Kankl): I think that representatives of the humanitarian sciences can also do a great deal. They must put forward ideas, formulate concepts for creating a better world, and foster in people the political culture to live in a civilized manner, under conditions of peace. We have come here as members of the American organization "Concerned Philosophers for Peace." It is part of the international organization "Philosophers of the Prevention of Omnicide" (from the Latin words "omnis," meaning "everyone," and "cido," meaning "I kill" -- editor's note). Our task is to involve as many philosophers in different countries as possible in the search for a solution to the problems of war and peace. Yes, we are divided by ideological differences, but I know that many philosophers are working on overcoming them for the sake of preserving civilization.

G. Mikhaylov: In seeking to establish trust between our peoples, it is important to utilize the entire humanist potential. People's education in the spirit of peace and cooperation must begin at a young age, for without this the path to the new thinking will prove very difficult. A "peace lesson" is held in our schools on the first day of school, and the ideas of peace and cooperation are widely reflected in school textbooks.

(J. Kankl): It is hard for me to say how this matter is organized in our schools, but I know that certain universities have study programs designed to make young people think in accordance with the realities of our times. At the University of Dayton, for example, there is a course which shows what nuclear war would lead to. The majority of young people have only heard about this in passing, and so truthful information literally flabbergasts them. Within the framework of this course we also elucidate ethical notions of war and peace in general and nuclear war in particular. We speak about the views of philosophers of different schools, including the Marxist school. The final part is a debate on the alternative to nuclear war. We do not impose a particular viewpoint on the students, but the very logic of the course leads them to humanist conclusions.

(D. Kedi): In one of my recent works I expounded ideas along the lines of the new political thinking. I tried to demonstrate that, when nuclear weapons are used, war according to the "rules" is impossible and no one's security can be guaranteed....

In that work I analyzed a phenomenon which I call "technological pacifism." Traditional pacifism proceeds from the premise that all war is evil. In our times such pacifism is not effective enough. The new, "technological pacifism," which proceeds from the categories of the interdependence and integrity of peace, must be based on understanding of the potential of modern equipment and technology. I also endeavored to draw attention to the problem of local wars. The planet's nuclear oversaturation obliges us to take a new look at these, too. For today a local conflict is fraught with the threat of escalation into a global, nuclear conflict. Understand me correctly, I see perfectly well the difference between someone who takes up a rifle to defend his family and a government which intends to use ballistic missiles to defend its ideology. It is one thing to defend your own borders, and another to have military bases all over the globe. That is no longer defense!

B. Marushkin: I understand the idea of what you call "technological pacifism." But I do not think education in traditional moral values should be disregarded. [paragraph continues]

Of course, you know of the view of history as a continuous succession of wars which have served almost as a stimulus to human progress. But history demonstrates that man -- both as a biological species and as an intelligent being -- has survived and developed not thanks to wars but thanks to cooperation and mutual assistance. Geneticists also have convincing proof of this.... But let us assume that hitherto mankind was incapable of resolving its contradictions without wars. In that case we are now faced with the task of learning how to resolve them without recourse to weapons. For, prior to 1945, history had never experimented on people with an absolute threat to everyone. Experience of past history has proved inadequate to the new situation that has arisen as a result of the creation of nuclear weapons. It is a unique situation and must be resolved by everyone together. Yes, the ideological differences are great. And yet our countries were able to struggle together against fascism. We must extol that experience.

[Jo Kanki]: And also throw forces into the struggle against ideologically colored "stereotypes of ignorance" that presuppose a wittingly negative attitude to what is incomprehensible and alien. We can also do a great deal by revealing the extreme danger of new inventions and discoveries in the arms sphere. For people frequently do not see the crux of the matter behind complex formulas and terminology -- which also applies to the "star wars" program... [conversation ends]

How did the conversation end? With a joke. When (D. Kedi) remarked with a smile that almost the biggest difficulty in asserting the new political thinking in people's awareness is precisely the fact that it is new. G. Mkhaylov recalled an episode in the life of B. Franklin. When he was in France as a U.S. envoy, some Parisian aristocrat wrinkled her nose and asked him of what use were balloons, at which Franklin remarked: "Madam, of what use is a newborn baby?"

It is the concern of all parents to ensure that a newborn baby finds its feet as soon as possible.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS REPORTS: VIENNA CONFERENCE ON SECURITY

LD120330 Moscow TASS in English 2014 GMT 11 Sep 86

[Text] Vienna, 11 Sep (TASS)--TASS correspondent Anatoliy Tyupayev reports:

The international conference on ways to build up confidence and international security is continuing at the UN Center in Vienna. The delegates to the conference representatives of the academic community and anti-war movements from 15 countries of Europe, Asia and America are discussing a broad range of questions pertaining to ensuring detente, building up confidence between states with different social systems, invigorating efforts aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals and renouncing military preparations in outer space.

Many speakers expressed approval of the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries. As Lorenz Knorr, member of the directorate of the German Peace Union (FRG), said, the peace proposals put forward by the Soviet Union are a tremendous and effective contribution to building up confidence between states.

Professor D. Pavlov (Bulgaria) expressed conviction that the Soviet proposals show the way on which it is necessary to advance towards ending the deadlock on the issue of the arms race and growing international tensions.

Professor F. Meyer (Austria) stressed in a TASS interview that of tremendous international significance are Mikhail Gorbachev's answers to the questions of the editor-in-chief of the newspaper RUDE PRAVO. These answers, F. Meyer pointed out, set forth most explicitly the perspective of ensuring lasting peace. They are permeated with the spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, the wish to contribute towards ridding peoples of the threat of nuclear war. The Austrian scientist noted that the appraisal of the international situation, which is given by the Soviet Union, meets everywhere with growing understanding, since the U.S. military-industrial complex threatens now not only the socialist countries, but the whole world. This conference shows that it is getting clear to increasing numbers of scientists that the way to cooperation and mutual understanding lies through the policy of disarmament.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET JOURNAL: 'MILITARY ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY'

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 8, Aug 86 pp 79-87

[Article by B. Pyadyshev]

[Text]

There are grounds for saying that the idea of an all embracing system of international security put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress is gaining more and more weight to become a key constructive factor in international affairs.

The Soviet appeal for closer and more productive cooperation to create such a system is addressed to governments, parties, public organisations and movements which are truly concerned over the destiny of peace on the Earth. It has met with wide response. To be sure, reaction to the idea of an all embracing security system had not been uniform, running the gamut of political shades from resolute support to a wait-and-see policy which includes a wish to take a closer look at the essence of the new Soviet initiative, reservations about its various aspects and doubts that such large-scale restructuring of international relations is a feasible proposition. To complete the picture, one must add that the reply from some circles has been a definite "no".

And yet the main thing is that the idea of an all embracing international security system is winning people over, prompting lively discussion and serious hopes that it will at long last be possible to find a way out of the present state of international relations which is growing more complicated day by day threatening mankind with a suicidal nuclear conflict.

The meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states, held on June 10-11 in Budapest, authoritatively gave top priority to that idea. The allied socialist states stated their intention to establish a comprehensive system of international security embracing military and political, as well as economic and humanitarian fields. They stressed that their foreign policy line, confirmed in the decisions of the congresses of the ruling parties, is aimed at building world security, a world without weapons, without wars.

What is it about the Soviet initiative that rivets the attention of political leaders and the world public at large?

Foreign commentators stress that the idea of an all-embracing international security system reflects the innovative approach of the Soviet leadership to the state of world affairs, an approach based on the perception of the world as a complex, contradictory and ever more interconnected whole. The truth about international life today is that the security of each nation directly depends on the security of all other nations, which makes it meaningless to be concerned only about one's own security, let alone security to the detriment of the other side. National security

will become weaker unless it takes into account universal security and all the nations feel they are in an equal position.

Furthermore, the relevance of an all embracing international security system can be seen from the fact that it fully reckons with the grim realities of the nuclear and space age which to all intents and purposes make the prevention of war synonymous with mankind's survival. Traditional political categories like "war" and "victory in war" are increasingly seen as unacceptable and senseless. No state, however great its military and technological potential, has a chance of protecting itself by military and technological means alone. The preservation of peace cannot indefinitely continue to be built on fear of retaliation, and the doctrine of "deterrence". In addition to the absurdity and amorality of the situation in which the whole mankind is becoming a nuclear hostage, such doctrines encourage the arms race which may sooner or later get out of control.

Finally, foreign reactions stress that for the first time in history the international community has been presented with a programme for ensuring peace which brings all the essential components of present-day international relations into a balanced complex and treats them with a high sense of responsibility. The fundamental principles of an all-embracing system of international security formulated by the 27th CPSU Congress envisages a clearly defined range of measures in the military, political, economic and humanitarian fields. Taken together, they assure steady advance towards eliminating the threat of thermonuclear conflict from the life of human society and making peaceful coexistence the supreme and universal principle in international relations. All the measures proposed are feasible and devoid of the element of propaganda.

The new political strategy formulated by the 27th Congress of the CPSU considers the goal of preserving civilisation more important than the narrow interests of blocs, nations, and so on. The full import of this new approach has not perhaps been understood in the government and political circles in the capitalist world. Apparently, not all people have realised that many of the centuries-old differences, disputes and convictions built into modern life become meaningless in the face of the increasingly tangible threat of a devastating explosion of even part of the existing nuclear arsenals. Lenin at the dawn of this century foresaw that the trend in the development of military technology could in time pose a threat to life on the Earth. Today the military applications of scientific and technological achievements have brought humanity to the ultimate line.

I

Thus, all issues and the very destiny of humanity depend on whether it will be possible to stop and reverse the arms race and take effective measures to prevent a nuclear war. It is only logical therefore that in an all-embracing international security system proposals in the military field are given top priority.

The Soviet Union proposes that the *nuclear powers agree to renounce war—both nuclear and conventional—against each other or against third countries.*

The idea of outlawing wars had engaged the best minds of humanity since time immemorial. History knows of many projects of eternal peace and renunciation of military methods of settling disputes arising between states. The desire to rule out aggressive, unjust and plunderous wars from the life of humankind first acquired concrete substance in the first legislative act of the Soviet government, i.e., Lenin's Decree on Peace adopted by the Second All-Russia Congress of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies on November 8, 1917. Throughout the decades that

followed Soviet diplomacy has been firmly committed to this idea, to implementing Lenin's behest to rid mankind of the fear of war.

One instance to prove it is that the Soviet government joined the Paris treaty on the renunciation of war on September 6, 1928, ten days after it was signed. Further proof of the Soviet government's commitment to peace was the signing on its initiative in Moscow in February 1929 of the protocol to bring into effect this pact ahead of schedule.

Foreign comments on Moscow's initiative concerning an all-embracing international security system often contain the question: why is it that only the nuclear powers are offered to renounce war? The answer is, because their actions can threaten mankind's existence. But there is another side to the matter. To call for universal renunciation of war means to put forward a task that is patently unattainable in the present-day conditions. Today's world, made up of almost 200 various states, contains too much "combustible material" to make the prevention of all conflicts a realistic proposition. This is not a task that can be solved today while the prevention of a nuclear war is not only within the power of the international community, but an imperative because otherwise there can be only one outcome—the end of human civilisation.

This is not to suggest that in appealing above all to the nuclear powers the USSR is indifferent to how relations are forming between all other states. The Soviet Union has exerted and continues to exert serious efforts to put out seats of war in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and other regions where armed conflicts between non-nuclear states arise. Socialism's ideal is life without wars.

One requirement for getting the nuclear powers to agree to renounce war as an instrument of politics is a drastic change in the mentality of people, notably state policy-makers, a departure from the deep-seated conviction that wars and armed conflicts in the relations between states are as natural as the succession of day and night in nature. Bringing about such a change is no easy matter, but there is simply no other alternative.

The Soviet Union is ready for it. The entire history of the Soviet state proves that the Soviet people only took up arms when forced to do so by aggressors and interventionists and that all the wars it has waged over its seven decades of existence have been exclusively defensive wars. This is an unassailable truth widely admitted by people abroad, including many authoritative members of the US establishment who have an objective perception of history.

Their general line of reasoning goes like this: Moscow has always seen military force as a means of defending the socialist cause and has not considered force to be the decisive element in the advance of the historical process. The Russian attention to military potential reflects Russian history, including Western attempts to disrupt the Bolshevik revolution and the human losses the Soviet Union suffered during the Second World War. Raymond Garthoff, a noted American international affairs expert, stresses in his major book *Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* that Soviet leaders today are convinced that detente meets the interests of the Soviet Union and that nuclear war should be prevented.¹

As for the militarist circles in the USA, Garthoff notes that they often tend to base their military decisions on dubious data and speculations about Soviet intentions, often on the rather "strange" principle whereby US leaders impute their own plans and aspirations to the other side.

¹ See R. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, 1985.

The policy of the United States has always included a powerful military stand. Not infrequently weapons still hot from one clash were put to use in another. Researchers from the US Taft University, have calculated that in the period between the end of the Second World War and the mid-1980s the USA used force in various-intensity conflicts and military actions overseas about once every two months, and the Pentagon resorted to nuclear threats almost every other year. None of these wars was a defensive or just war on Washington's part.

It is no secret that the West still has scenarios of nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. An attempt is being made to mislead the public on the issues of war and peace and make it believe that war, a nuclear conflict included, is as normal and acceptable a perspective as peaceful development. Moreover, it may even be desirable as "there are things more worse than war." Americans above all are being told that they need not fear a nuclear showdown. Arguments that the USA could be safe in a third world war and hopes to win the global confrontation by force using the most monstrous types of weapons are not confined to fanaticism of anti-communists or the scholarly research of some politicians, scientists and writers. Such suicidal illusions are inherent in Washington's official policy.

The Soviet Union cannot afford to ignore all this. While showing the necessary measure of concern for the defense capability of the USSR and its allies, the Soviet leadership is committed to a military policy that would not give anyone cause for fears, even imaginary, for its security. One direct way to achieve it is political agreement among the nuclear powers not to use weapons against one another.

This was the substance of the May 1972 Soviet-American document The Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. On June 22, 1973, a Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed in which both sides committed themselves to act in such a way as to preclude nuclear war between them and between each of the sides and third countries. Subsequently, renunciation of nuclear war as a matter of principle became part and parcel of the documents the USSR signed with Britain, France and some other countries. The United Nations has repeatedly voiced its full agreement with this principle.

Declarations adopted at such authoritative levels do not pass unnoticed in the international community. They bring home to statesmen and the public at large that political means and agreements can erect a reliable barrier in the way of the military danger. In this connection, considerable significance is attached to the Soviet-American statement issued by the Geneva summit in November 1985 to the effect that nuclear war must never be unleashed and there could be no winners in it. While admitting that any conflict between the USSR and the USA could have catastrophic consequences, the leaders of the two states stressed the importance of preventing any war between them, nuclear or conventional. The two sides will not seek military superiority.

The Soviet Union is acting in precisely this way. And it persistently calls on the other side to act accordingly. If, as it happened in Geneva, an agreement has been reached, it has to be backed up by practical steps to eliminate the war danger, to head off a nuclear war and to stop material preparations for it.

II

This forms the essence of another set of proposals of the 27th CPSU Congress dealing with the all-embracing system of international security in the military sphere: viz., *prevention of the arms race in outer space*,

cessation of all nuclear weapons tests and the total destruction of such weapons, a ban on and the destruction of chemical weapons and renunciation of the development of other means of mass annihilation.

The Soviet state has come up with a concrete programme for nuclear disarmament set out in the Statement of January 15, 1986. The struggle to realise it, stresses the Resolution of the 27th CPSU Congress on the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee must form the main direction of the Soviet foreign policy for the coming years. The "fulfilment of this historic programme, which is epoch-making in its scope and significance, would open for humanity a fundamentally new period of development, the possibility of concentrating on constructive work alone."²

The Soviet Union, together with the fraternal Warsaw Treaty countries, is ready for the broadest cooperation with other countries in the key areas of effort to build a secure world for all.

Stopping nuclear weapons tests is the most natural and the easiest step to take in limiting the arms race. The way to solve this task is a mutual Soviet-American moratorium on nuclear explosions, immediate commencement of negotiations on a total ban of nuclear tests under strict control. In his address on Soviet television May 14, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that in the conditions when nuclear issues command growing attention, the Soviet government, having weighed all the circumstances pertaining to the security of its people and all mankind, has decided to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests until August 6, 1986, i.e., the day when, more than forty years ago, the first atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima killing hundreds of thousands of people. "We again call on the United States," said Mikhail Gorbachev, "to consider the extent of the danger hanging over humankind with all responsibility and to heed the opinion of the world community. Let those who lead the USA demonstrate their concern for the life and health of people by their deeds."³ More recently the USSR has appealed to Britain to launch a joint initiative to resume the tripartite talks broken off in 1980, all the more so because at that time the three powers were agreed that nuclear weapons tests had to be banned.

Another important area of effort to prevent the war danger is the total liquidation, on a mutual basis, of Soviet and American medium-range nuclear missiles in the European zone. The USSR has proposed a concrete proposal to that effect at the current Soviet-American talks in Geneva on nuclear and space weapons, a proposal that offers a real chance of an early agreement given US goodwill.

As for the "interim agreement" on medium-range missiles proposed by the American delegation at the Geneva talks, it contains a built-in flaw because the proposed formula would enable the USA to more than double the number of its nuclear warheads on its medium-range missiles in Europe while the number of corresponding Soviet missiles would be cut.

The Soviet Union by its practical acts seeks to help progress at the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons with a view to meeting the task set in the joint Soviet-American statement of January 8, 1985, namely: to prevent the arms race in outer space and halt it on the Earth.⁴

² 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p. 111 (in Russian).

³ *Pravda*, May 15, 1986.

⁴ *Soviet-American Summit Meetings. Geneva. November 19-21, 1985. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1985, p. 11 (in Russian).

Progress at the Geneva talks, however, is being obstructed by the American side. Throughout all five rounds the American side has failed to introduce anything new from what it had said earlier and what was clearly unacceptable. This applies to the US position on outer space, on strategic arms and on medium-range nuclear weapons. The US delegation was chary even of making cosmetic changes, let alone essential changes in its stand. The official American contention that the USA introduced a fresh element in the negotiations on November 1, 1985, and February 24, 1986, is simply not true.

The Soviet Union has carefully studied the American proposals at the Geneva negotiations. It has said to the American side that what it proposes means not a reduction of nuclear weapons but their increase, not an end to the arms race but an invitation to one. In particular, the US proposals sidestep the main priority in the present strategic situation—to prevent the arms race from spreading to outer space because the objective state of affairs being what it is, efforts in nuclear arms reductions, let alone deep cuts, would become meaningless without a ban on strike space weapons. By replacing the problem of preventing the arms race in outer space with a vague concept of stabilisation of the interconnection between offensive and defensive armaments, the USA virtually proposes to legitimise the arms race both in outer space and on the Earth.

As for US considerations about strategic offensive weapons, on closer inspection they envisage a buildup of strategic arsenals even though, on the face of it, they speak of a 50-per cent cut. Instead of the summary level of 6,000 nuclear warheads on strategic carriers mentioned by the American side as the target for our countries, the USA, if its proposal were adopted, would see the number of its nuclear charges increase to over 15,000. This would happen because the Americans have proposed not to count nuclear warheads on all the heavy bombers that they would still have and about 5,000 warheads would escape the count. Besides, no limitations would be imposed on sea-based long-range cruise missiles.

The US proposals, were they to be adopted, would also break the structure of the Soviet strategic forces while preserving the structure of the American strategic forces. They would like us to break those systems which form the backbone of our strategic forces.

Recently, striving to reach a mutually acceptable accord in Geneva, the Soviet Union proposed the following option to the USA: an accord should be reached on compliance with the US-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems for the next 15 years, while the work on the SDI should not go beyond laboratory research. The strategic offensive weapons (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers) are restricted by equal levels.

In that case the issue of medium-range weapons reaching the territory of the other side, including land-based long-range cruise missiles, is settled separately.

As for the draft of an agreement on the medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR agrees that the British and French missiles in the present quantities can remain stationed in the European zone with the zero correlation of this type of weapons. The USSR also stated that it would not increase the number of medium-range missiles in Asia.

The Soviet Union is firmly committed to complete destruction, before the end of this century, not only of nuclear weapons, but also of chemical weapons and the industrial basis for their manufacture. The more detailed proposals introduced by the socialist countries at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament have the way for a quick solution of these problems.

While putting forward a total ban on and destruction of chemical weapons as the main task the Soviet Union believes that in the present situation some intermediate and partial steps towards that goal are possible. An agreement could be reached, for example, on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, i. e., on preventing its further geographical spread. Specifically, the proposal is, first, not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone; and, second, not to emplace chemical weapons on the territories of other countries. The USSR has always adhered to these principles in its own policy. It is essential that other states follow its example and exhibit similar restraint. If the number of states possessing these weapons increases and they appear in ever new regions of the planet, this would impede the talks in banning these weapons and heighten the danger of their use. The programme for manufacturing binary weapons by the USA, with possible storage and, use in Europe, approved by the NATO Military Planning Committee's session in Brussels in May, has caused grave fears among the world public.

It is only natural that along with the ban on nuclear, space and chemical weapons the Soviet Union proposes to renounce the development of other mass annihilation weapons.

Yet another area of the Soviet Union's efforts towards military détente is to bring about a substantial reduction in armed forces and conventional arms on the global and regional level. The Warsaw Treaty countries propose to begin such cuts in Europe where the concentration of troops and armaments has reached a particularly dangerous scale. Facing each other in Europe are armed forces possessing the most modern tanks, missiles and planes. And it is known that conventional weapons are constantly being improved, are becoming more sophisticated and powerful approaching mass annihilation weapons in their effect.

The USSR and its socialist allies propose to agree on significant cuts in all the components of the ground forces and tactical aviation of the European states and corresponding cuts in the US and Canadian forces. Geographically, the cuts should cover the whole territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

And this process should not stop at that stage. The allied socialist states propose that the process of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons of NATO and the WTO should continue. Substantial reductions in this direction would make it possible to draw other European states into this process.

These proposals are radical and realistic at the same time. As a first step it is planned to make a one-time mutual reduction of the numerical strength of the armed forces of the military-political alliances by 100-150 thousand men on each side. The WTO states are prepared to make immediate further reductions of the armed forces. As a result, given the reciprocal readiness of the NATO countries, by the early 1990s the land forces and the tactical strike aircraft of both alliances in Europe would be reduced by about a quarter compared to the present level.

Finally, it needs to be stressed that at all the stages of conventional arms reductions and disarmament the Soviet Union proposes real and effective verification in all fields with the use of both the national technical means and international procedures, including on-the-spot inspection when necessary. In particular, it is intended to establish an international consultative commission composed of the representatives of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, interested neutral and non-aligned states and other European countries with the aim of establishing verification of the reductions of the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe.

The Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee reads in part: "The USSR is open to verification... All-embracing, strictest verification

is perhaps the key element of the disarmament process. The essence of the matter, in our opinion, is that *there can be no disarmament without verification and that verification without disarmament makes no sense.*"⁵

III

The third group of all-embracing international security measures in the military sphere proposed by the 27th Congress of the CPSU is a *strictly controlled lowering of the levels of military capabilities of countries to limits of reasonable adequacy.*

This is a new and fundamentally important approach. It runs counter to the American philosophy of endless buildup of military arsenals which would bring nothing but irreparable damage to America and to other countries. The Soviet Union does not intend to pile up mountains of armaments. It is in favour of a level of military potentials that guarantees the defense of states, their security against external attack.

The Soviet military doctrine fully accords with the above-mentioned principles. It is distinctly defensive in character. The Soviet Union is a staunch enemy of any war, especially nuclear war, and it would like to see mass destruction weapons out of circulation. But it is clear that the nature and volume of a reasonably adequate military potential of the USSR are limited by the stands and actions taken by the USA and their partners in blocs. Under these conditions, *the Soviet Union "lays no claim to more security, but it will not settle for less,"* as the 27th Congress of the CPSU stressed.

The fourth group of measures in the military sphere proposed by the 27th CPSU Congress has to do with *the disbandment of military alliances, and, as a stage towards this—renunciation of their enlargement and of the formation of new ones.*

The division of the European continent into two opposing military political groupings is not our choice. The Warsaw Treaty was created as a necessary response to the setting up of the North Atlantic bloc six years earlier. The new proposals on disbanding the military groupings are evidence of the continuity in Soviet foreign policy, for the Soviet Union has repeatedly come out with the initiative of disbanding the military blocs, their military organisations as a first stage, both individually or jointly with its Warsaw Treaty allies.

To this day the West has failed to respond to these initiatives. On the contrary, recent years have seen further enlargement of the NATO bloc by the drawing of Spain into it. Washington has also put forward some ideas on possible expansion of the NATO bloc area, on "shared responsibility" of the bloc's members for the situation in the Middle East, in the South Atlantic, and so on. These are not mere words. The involvement of certain European NATO countries, notably Britain, in the US aggression against Libya lends substance to these ideas.

As long as Europe has opposing military-political groupings which the Warsaw Treaty states want to see disbanded their proposal to sign a Treaty on the Mutual Renunciation of the Use of Armed Force and on the Maintenance of Relations of Peace, to be open for other states to join, remains in force. The socialist allies do not rule out direct contacts between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO as organisations in order to take the edge off the present confrontation.

Europe needs a revival of detente, advance towards a more stable phase of detente. This is the only way to overcome the split of Europe and ensure peaceful development for all the continent's countries.

Finally, the fifth military measure towards an all-embracing interna-

⁵ 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 67 (in Russian).

tional security system is *balanced and commensurate reduction in military budgets*.

This is the idea the Soviet Union and its allies have put forward more than once. Proposals on military budget cuts put forward at several sessions of the UN General Assembly envisaged 10-per cent cuts for the states permanent members of the Security Council. The Warsaw Treaty countries have also proposed military budget cuts collectively in the declarations of the Political Consultative Committee meetings. In 1984, the Warsaw Treaty countries came up with detailed proposals for the freezing and reduction of military spending of the states. The Budapest appeal of the allied socialist states emphasised that the specific measures in the field of nuclear disarmament they proposed and the reduction of the armed forces and conventional weapons should be accompanied by correspondingly reducing military expenditures and transferring these means for economic and social development programmes.

Unfortunately, there has been no progress in that direction because of the opposition from NATO countries although the international community as represented by the UN has repeatedly voiced support for military budget reductions.

And yet progress on these issues could be useful not only for strengthening the security of the peoples but also for facilitating the solution of urgent problems facing many nations.

Such, then, are the military provisions of the Soviet programme for an all-embracing international security system.

In this complex and difficult time, when a holocaust, unless it is averted, would be equally disastrous for every country, large or small, distant or near, the stark question is: what must be done to save the human race? Who can be expected to come up with a safe and realistic answer?

It is clear that at present the governments of the USA, the leading West European NATO countries and Japan are on the whole committed to escalating military confrontation with the socialist world and the national liberation movements, to gaining military superiority through the "star wars" programme.

Indeed, the US Administration has taken a risky step by declaring that it refuses to observe the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2). This has evoked a wave of indignation in the USA itself and in the NATO countries, to say nothing of the political circles and the public at large in the non-aligned and neutral states. The policy of confrontation, far from promising stable peace and universal security, is fraught with grave and real dangers and aggravation of existing local conflicts. This inexorable fact is increasingly brought home to sober-minded leaders in the major capitalist countries and, coupled with the mounting worldwide antiwar, antinuclear and antimissile movement, is emerging as an important factor in domestic and foreign policies, a factor capitalist governments find it ever more difficult to ignore.

All this convinces mankind that the trail to military detente, to a world without arms and wars is being blazed by the vigorous foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. As it was noted in the Resolution of the June (1986) Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, the WTO states unanimously feel that what is needed is greater dynamism and a bold approach to solving both old and new problems connected with the struggle against the war threat and for consolidating peaceful coexistence. In their totality, the proposals in the military sphere made by the 27th CPSU Congress provide a realistic basis for an all-embracing international security system and offer a safe perspective for ending confrontation of force, the arms race and eliminating the nuclear danger.

RELATED ISSUES

IZVESTIYA PREVIEWS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ARMS DEBATES

PM151049 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Sep 86 Morning Edition pp 4, 5

[Melor Sturua Article: "Old Approach and New Thinking"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The questions of war and peace are eternal questions, but their solution now requires new thinking because we are at a crucial stage of world development, a time when the test of historical maturity consists of a "ticket" offering the following choice: Is human civilization to be or not to be.

Just before the Soviet delegation's departure for [the UN General Assembly session in] -- New York I asked V. F. Petrovskiy, deputy head of the USSR delegation and USSR deputy foreign minister, what the Soviet Union is taking to this session.

"The Soviet Union," he replied, "is taking to this session an expanded program for practical action to eliminate the nuclear threat, terminate the arms race, and preserve and strengthen world peace. Guided by the 27th CPSU Congress decisions, our country offers the world community new ideas and fresh approaches aimed at building a guaranteed peaceful future for all peoples in the world -- a future without wars and violence. We deem it exceptionally important that both the discussion at and the decisions of the 41st Un General Assembly Session, meeting at the concluding stage of International Peace Year, should be distinguished by new political thinking adequate to the demands of the nuclear and space era."

There is, however, new thinking and "new Thinking." The accomplished lackeys of U.S. imperialism, which has long felt constrained by the UN Charter, want to revise it on the grounds that it is supposedly a document of "the prenuclear era," that it is allegedly outdated and that it "evaporated in the smoke of Hiroshima." But time proves the exact opposite: It is necessary to abide by the Charter's spirit and letter firmly and scrupulously so that the whole of mankind does not evaporate in a smoke like that of Hiroshima.

This is precisely how the Soviet Union acts. The most convincing proof of this can be seen in the four extensions of the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions which came into force on 6 August last year -- the 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima tragedy. V. F. Petrovskiy emphasized in his conversation with me: "Here is a possible rewording of the well-known proverb: Tell me what your attitude to the moratorium is, and I will tell you whether you are a friend or an enemy of peace." Indeed, the moratorium has become a touchstone of the policy and a litmus paper of the true intentions of states and their leaders.

V. F. Petrovskiy recalls the seven "if's" from M. S. Gorbachev's replies to the RUDE PRAVO chief editor's questions. Here they are:

"If you want military superiority, you do not need a moratorium".

"If you want to continue the arms race, and in particular to transfer it to sophisticated types of weapons, you do not need a moratorium".

"If you want to have new and more sophisticated types of weapons, a moratorium serves no purpose".

"If you rely on force on the solution of international problems and intend to resort to diktat and blackmail, a moratorium stands in your way".

"If you are afraid to compete honestly with a different social system in the spheres of the economy, democracy, culture, and spiritual richness of human life, a moratorium is clearly unsuitable".

"If you are unconcerned about what will happen to nature and people's environment, you will continue to conduct nuclear explosions".

"If the greedy appetites of military business bosses and everyone linked with them are more important than the opinion and vital interests of hundreds of millions of people all over the world, you will continue nuclear tests."

Being not a declaration but an action, the moratorium has already become an integral political and military reality of the contemporary world. It is particularly important in the context of UN activity: For almost 30 years now the General Assembly has been persistently calling for the termination and banning of nuclear tests. The actions of the U.S. side, which responded to the silence at Soviet nuclear testing ranges with 20 nuclear explosions, are in direct contradiction with the will of the world community. The United Nations, with its collective authority, can and must help in ensuring that the rejection of nuclear tests turns from a slogan into reality. The appeal adopted a few days ago by the Nonaligned Movement in Harare rightly says on the subject of terminating tests that "the world's peoples would acclaim such a step, which would be a significant contribution to the cause of diminishing the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would help progress in other disarmament spheres."

The indivisibility of our world, and simultaneously its fragility, can perhaps be sensed better at the United Nations than anywhere else. Being a reflection of objective reality, this realization has contributed greatly to the emergence of the new thinking. An expression of this thinking can be seen in the proposal to create an all-embracing system of international security put forward by the group of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, in good time for discussion at the forthcoming session. This initiative is a generalized embodiment of the coordinated foreign policy line of the socialist community, its contribution to the shaping of a global philosophy and a program for the creation of a safe world, which should be set in opposition to the existing global threat to mankind.

I asked V.F. Petrovskiy about the new element in raising the question of creating an all-embracing system of international security. He replied: "The new element is the fact that it presupposes repudiation of the dangerous delusion -- in our age fatal for all mankind -- that one's own security can be strengthened to the detriment of other

states through building up the latest weapon systems. The arms race leads to 'zero' security. Real security in the nuclear age cannot be ensured via military superiority: It can only be universal and equal. The problem of ensuring security today does not lend itself to solution by military-technical means.

"The new element in the socialist countries' proposal also consists in its presupposing a multifaceted and comprehensive approach to the problem of security. In today's interdependent world, this problem cannot be confined within a military-political framework. Real security can be ensured through eliminating the causes of mistrust and tension in the world. Thus, an all-embracing system of international security must encompass all spheres of world politics — the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

"The socialist countries have put forward a large-scale initiative based on long-term considerations. They strive to ensure that all UN member states play a part in elaborating the new concept of international security. This is another feature of the innovative approach to the 41st session."

The great philosopher Kant said that the things worthy of the greatest admiration are the moral law within and the starry heavens above. To paraphrase the great thinker, it is possible to say that an all-embracing system of international security must today become a moral law of the community of states and peoples. And the starry heavens above people's heads must be strictly peaceful. This is why the Soviet Union opposes the Washington "star wars" program with its "star peace" program, and now submits it for judgement by the peoples at the UN forum.

Concluding the conversation, V.F. Petrovskiy said:

"Our approach to the session is oriented entirely toward an honest, constructive, and responsible dialogue, toward joint quest for answers to burning questions in the interests of universal security, trust, and international cooperation. The Soviet Union is fully determined to ensure that, in our complex, contradictory, and at the same time interdependent world, the United Nations is an important instrument for such a quest, a real center for coordinating the activities of all states."

We wish you success, Comrades, in this noble work!

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CSO: 5200/1587

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW RADIO ROUND TABLE ON MORATORIUM, NST, SALT II, SUMMIT

LD211919 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 21 Sep 86

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Radomir Georgiyevich Bogdanov, deputy director of the USA and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; publicist Nikolay Vladimirovich Shishlin; and Vladimir Yakovlevich Tsvetov, Central Television and All-Union Radio political observer]

[Text] [Tsvetov] Hello, comrades. Perhaps the most important event of the past week was the opening of the latest UN General Assembly session. As you know, comrades, there are 143 questions on the session's agenda. About one-third of them have to do with averting nuclear conflicts, reducing stockpiles of mass-destruction weapons and conventional armaments, and banning chemical and bacteriological weapons. I think, however, that one question will attract special attention among the participants of the General Assembly session. This question in its final form has been formulated on the agenda as follows: The question of creating an all-embracing system of international peace and security. I remind you that this question was put on the General Assembly session's agenda by the Soviet Union, the delegation of Belorussia and Ukraine, and by a number of socialist countries. Indeed, the foundations of a system of international security were formulated at the 27th CPSU Congress.

It is about the foundations of this system. I think, that we shall now talk.

[Shishlin] Perhaps, however, we shall not only talk about the foundations, because I reckon that the listeners are acquainted with the documents of the 27th Party Congress and the speeches explaining what the Soviet Union has in mind in putting forward the concept of the creation on an all-embracing system of international security, which indeed as the result of collective work has already been transformed into a concept of creating a system of international peace and security.

We shall concentrate our attention on a key link in this problem, namely, the present real state of affairs regarding the question of questions in international politics, the question of the limiting and curtailing the arms race. If I may be permitted, I would simply like to remind the listeners what has been done by the Soviet Union in this period of less than 9 months. On 15 January the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear armaments before the end of the present century. Further, a little earlier the Soviet Union extended its unilateral moratorium, which later on was extended four times; and, up to the present day, silence reigns on the Soviet nuclear testing grounds. Our critics were reproaching us for the fact that the Soviet Union, while speaking of the elimination of nuclear armaments and

chemical weapons, was forgetting about conventional armaments, which with regard to their characteristics now are certainly extremely dangerous and have great strike potential. Even these reproaches, however, were invalid right from the outset really. They were deflected by the proposal by the socialist countries for deep reductions in conventional armaments in an extensive zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Soviet Union also has come forward with the concept of strengthening peace, cooperation, and security in the zone of the Asian and Pacific region. These Soviet ideas have not simply been piled up, one on the other, like a layer cake, so to speak. No, all these ideas have been supplementing and developing that from which we began, Vladimir Yakovlevich; namely that selfsame general direction in socialist foreign policy toward consolidating peace and creating indeed a system of security, under which the borders and sovereignty of each country, whether it be big, medium-sized, or small, would be inviolate.

As for U.S. foreign policy baggage in this period of less than 9 months, it probably will be best for Radomir Georgiyevich, who is engaged professionally with this, to speak on the subject.

[Bogdanov] You know, this is a fairly simple issue for me. I think that it is just as simple for you, because baggage for me, I think, is limited to just a small light cosmetic case. We are not talking about such baggage. We are talking about quite a different kind, namely, the artificial encumbrances and other obstacles of every kind in the way of the implementation of this all-embracing system of international security, about which we are speaking. Indeed, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the idea of an all-embracing system of international security and peace is truly all-embracing and universal in character. Therein lies, perhaps, not only its novelty but also its completely and fundamentally new approach. No one is being deprived of security. On the contrary, security is being proposed for everyone. It is being proposed from the Atlantic to the Pacific region. In essence, our concept of security encompasses the whole world, in which both the Soviet Union and the United States occupy a worthy place as major powers possessing nuclear weapons and possessing the capability to either promote, or on the contrary, to upset this security. For...

[Tsvetov, interrupting] It is not only a question of geography.

[Bogdanov] No, of course it is not just a question of geography. For 9 months the Soviet Union has with absolute consistency and increasingly put forward a series of proposals that have been aimed, if you like, at drawing the United States into this dialogue of peace and security.

[Shishlin] Yes, indeed. Excuse me, Radomir Geogiyevich, but I want to interrupt you. All of us have had the opportunity to familiarize ourselves with what Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev had to say during his trip to Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, and you have probably paid attention to the fact that Soviet people were asking Mikhail Sergeyevich outright whether we are speaking the language of concessions to the United States and whether in this regard we are displaying some weakness.

[Bogdanov] Nikolay Vladimirovich, this is a very important question. I must say to you that even I -- you kindly referred to me as a professional -- and probably you and Vladimir Yakovlevich as well have also been asking the question of whether in this respect we are not displaying too much softness, or, as it is being held, even weakness. No, the fact is that we are indeed drawing the United States into a dialogue of peace and security. The whole point is that this is a completely unusual field of play for our U.S. counterparts. For decades, all the consciousness of these people was

oriented toward confrontation and forcible methods of fighting. Now we are drawing them into a field to which they are quite unaccustomed, where it is necessary to play by completely different rules, employing quite different principles, and, what is most important, to always remember in this respect that there is no security for oneself without security for one's partner.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was very much on the mark when he said that they want to exasperate us and want to make us lose our restraint. To travel so confidently and consistently along the path of peace is precisely evidence of strength and not weakness. After all, Mikhail Sergeyevich is right. Over there in recent months they have only been busy inventing how to launch a new (Gary) Powers into Soviet-U.S. relations and thinking up something to bring Soviet-U.S. relations to the brink of catastrophe. This is a clash between two dramatically opposed ways of thinking, and I must say -- and I think you will support my view -- that in summing up the results of the Soviet Union's month peace offensive, we have every ground to show optimism. In this field we are winning.

[Shishlin] I absolutely agree with this thought except for the fact that for purely personal reasons, I do not like the term "peace offensive," although I am aware that it is used in official and semi-official documents. I think that, altogether, here it is a question of defense and not of attack and of defense and not of an offensive. It is indeed a policy which accords with the diagnoses of the nuclear and space age, where we have frequently been putting the United States into a difficult position by virtue of the fact that they are adhering to the former conservative forcible methods. We are by no means concerned about seeing the United States lose. Indeed, we want the United States to win by agreeing to deep reductions in armaments, the curtailment of armament, and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

[Tsvetov] We want them to win with respect to their own security.

[Shishlin] That is certainly so.

[Tsvetov] I would like to draw the listeners' attention to the fact that the thought that was expressed by Radomir Georgiyevich has got through also to many Americans. It has gotten through to them despite all the attempts by the administration to prevent a realization by the United States that security can only be reciprocal in the present-day world and that now it is impossible to achieve one's own security by putting the opposite side into a position of vulnerability regarding its security.

Not long ago, a public opinion poll was conducted in the United States and I would like to cite some of the results of the poll. Interest was shown in the participants' views on the following question: Should the United States surpass the USSR in military might, or should the United States be equal with the USSR, or should the United States be weaker than the Soviet Union? Fifty percent of those polled said that the United States and the USSR should be equal in regard to military might. Another question was asked as to whether Gorbachev looks like a leader who is aware that the USSR and the United States are capable of mutually destroying each other and who is therefore ready to reach a verifiable agreement on arms control. Of those polled, 79 percent indicated that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is seen by them as precisely such a sober-minded leader who is ready for negotiations.

I would also like to expand another one of your ideas, Radomir Georgiyevich. You very correctly said that the present U.S. Administration is not used to playing in the field of peaceful competition and this is manifested through uncertainty even in the position with respect to this or that issue of nuclear disarmament. Today the administration representatives are saying that they are putting forward concrete new proposals; the next day those same representatives suddenly announce that they are about to expel 25 members of the Soviet delegation at the United Nations from New York. Today representatives of the U.S. Administration say they are interested in developing a dialogue with the Soviet Union, but tomorrow they organize a spying operation by their agent in the Soviet Union. This vacillation also indicates that they are unsure of themselves; and I think their lack of confidence in their stance is further explained by the following: Here are two reports, both from the United States, both dated 17 September. One says that a member of the administration responsible for arms control issued a confidential order to the U.S. Air force not to exceed the SALT limits for nuclear armaments before the summit meeting, which it is assumed should take place after the elections; thereby cancelling President Reagan's instruction given in May to cease observance of SALT II by mid-November. The other report, of the same date and from the same U.S. city, from Washington: President Reagan has opposed the amendment passed by the House of Representatives calling on the Administration to continue observing the SALT II Treaty.

[Bogdanov] Now this contradiction that you have been talking about, Vladimir Yakovlevich, looks to me like a rather cunning line of tactic, which is to prepare to slam the door on the possibility of a summit meeting, but to do it in such a way as to shift the responsibility onto the Soviet side. With one hand they make gestures signalling: yes, we are willing, while with the other they do all they can to dispel that impression immediately. At the same time, we understand that many domestic political problems in the United States -- the imminent midterm elections, and the presidential election campaign which, in effect, has already begun -- are making the administration's behavior rather problematic, as it were. They are forcing major figures in the administration to keep these internal political factors in mind above all.

But, however that may be, this is the United States' business; it is their problem, their internal problem. But, as for the problems that concern us it is a dishonest apologetic game that is being played here; dishonest. The examples you have just cited are, I would say, two very vivid examples, but only two. There are a great many more such examples. Look even at the contradictory behavior of congress on certain matters. You probably all remember the fine history of Soviet-U.S. relations: The moment Soviet-U.S. relations begin to straighten out and emerge into some sort of positive setting, we get Powers, or we get the Korean spy plane; and now it is the Daniloff affair.

[Shishlin] That is right. The Soviet Union says honestly and openly that it is interested in holding a Soviet-U.S. meeting. A minimum of two conditions is necessary. The first is that there should be a favorable political atmosphere. I think our listeners can answer the question of whether it is favorable or unfavorable today for themselves. The second condition is that there must be progress at least on one or two serious major questions concerning international security and of course the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations. This second question is harder to answer. The Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space armaments have just resumed in Geneva. According to custom, they have been preceded, on the U.S. side, by a certain amount of publicity as to what the United States is taking with them on its latest trip to Geneva. It has been said that the President has given the delegation instructions to

be flexible and constructive, that new ideas and new considerations will be put on the conference table. Though the United States is very fond of reproaching the Soviet Union for first unveiling its ideas publicly and then incorporating them in the next of negotiations, in this case, the United States is the pot calling the kettle black; and they themselves, of course, are frequently at fault in regard to leaking of all sorts of information.

[Bogdanov] I would say, Nikolay Vladimirovich, that they are past masters when it comes to leaks. It is a carefully worked-out and extremely cunning system for manipulating public opinion by means of these leaks.

[Shishlin] Yes, and what are they bringing to Geneva? If we are to believe the U.S. press -- and here it probably has to be believed -- they are bringing considerations in which they will be talking about strategic arms reduction. Given a certain symmetry of strategic armaments -- Soviet and U.S. -- some sort of approximate balance of forces does exist. So the United States wants to propose to us a kind of reduction in which the U.S. submarine-based strategic missiles would be left out of the talks altogether; the long-range sea-based cruise missiles also would not be dealt with at all. Yet, the Soviet Union is invited to even out the balance in land missiles and in...

[Tsvetov, interrupting] Bombers.

[Shishlin] In bombers. In other words, it is almost as if we were being asked to abolish what we have and create what we do not have.

Well, of course, all this will be laid bare at the talks themselves; but the current nature of the information that is being leaked does not enable one to say affirmatively that the prerequisites have already been created for serious results on one or two questions concerning the consolidation of international security.

[Bogdanov] But, Nikolay Vladimirovich, these actions all come out of the same box, to create the impression that the U.S. side is meeting us halfway; that it is interested in a summit meeting; that it is doing everything to ensure that such a meeting takes place. Even your brief analysis shows that these are things that are totally unacceptable to the Soviet Union. They are unacceptable, not because we are being stubborn, but because they are simply dishonest and unjust; and they are not in keeping with the principle of equal and similar security for the sides. They are deliberately arranging the leaks, deliberately noising all this abroad to mislead the uninformed reader or listener and show him once again: look how uncompromising the Soviet Union is! And this on the eve of the highly important meeting that took place on Friday and Saturday between the two heads of the foreign policy departments. So how sincere is the position of the U.S. side, and what do they really want?

[Tsvetov] One can judge about the level of sincerity on the U.S. side by going back once again to the report I read out which says that an official from the Administration had instructed the Air Force not to reequip the bomber so as not to exceed the limits of the SALT II. But there is no mention of the fact that the United States has been violating the SALT II treaty not only along the line of redesigning bombers but also along the line of modernizing missiles. You know that according to the terms of the SALT II treaty, both sides may modernize only one type of missile, whereas the U.S. side has been introducing at least two types of new missiles, or has been developing [razrabatyvayet] them to introduce as armaments. Nothing is being said about this, yet this is what is being done.

[Bogdanov] You see the problem of the violation of treaties is one of the administration's favorite hobby horses. As soon as a need arises to present the Soviet side in dark colors, as soon as another batch of doubts about the Soviet Union has to be sown in the souls of narrow-minded people, the fairly worn tale about violations of agreements and treaties by the Soviet Union is immediately dragged into light. But this is only a part of what the U.S. side is actually doing. In accordance with treaties, we have in Geneva the consultative standing commission, which has been set up to look into and to analyze complaints from the sides concerning the fulfillment of these agreements and treaties if such complaints arise. And there is a rule: Everything that takes place within the walls of the commission must not be divulged. We have been following this principle and holding it sacred. As for the U.S. side, there has been not only continuous leaking but also continuous falsification and misinformation.

[Shishlin] It seems that they have already announced that they would not work in this commission any longer, as they have announced that they are pulling out both from the temporary agreement of 1972 and from the SALT II Treaty; and it is absolutely clear, though they have not said this, that they are also smashing up the ABM treaty with their work within the framework of the Star Wars program.

[Tsevtov] Yes, the recent experiment with the Delta missile is evidence of this. This missile put in orbit two satellites which maneuvered relative to each other, passed information about each other, and then one of them, which was stuffed with explosives crashed into the other satellite. In fact, this was a rehearsal for destroying enemy missiles. This is a violation of the ABM treaty.

[Bogdanov] This is a signal to the Soviet side -- this is what you have said, Nikolay Vladimirovich -- that the 1972 ABM treaty is next in turn to be broken. It is an utterly unambiguous signal.

[Tsvetov] You know, I would like to direct your attention to yet another aspect of the Soviet foreign initiatives. I mean the proposal to set up a security system in the Asian-Pacific region. It seems to me that this region is becoming more and more important now. I will cite only two figures: If in 1962 the share of the Asian-Pacific region in the world production output amounted to 9 percent, it was 13 percent in 1985, and the share of this region in world exports amounted, in 1962, to 8 percent, whereas now it is 19 percent. In other words, as both Japanese and U.S. political scientists put it, the world's center is gradually shifting from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific. It is natural that the problems that are worrying this region or complicating the situation in it are attracting not only the attention of the whole world but ours as well.

[Shishlin] Yes, and of course the region is extremely interesting in itself and is undergoing a dynamic development. The figures you gave are forceful evidence of it. Yet many problems on which the fate of both the Asian-Pacific region and the world as such depend are intersecting there. But I would not like to create the impression that no other processes other than negative ones are happening in this region. There are positive processes, too, and I would mention, among them, the recent visit by Comrade Talyzin to China and the intensive broad talks that were held by our delegation in that country. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega has visited the PRC and the DPRK, and one must say that Chinese comrades are giving Nicaragua a certain help -- political, moral, economic -- and, strictly speaking, very important pronouncements were made in Beijing on the position by the PRC relative to the countries of the so-called Third World. On the whole, the results of this visit are undoubtedly positive.

[Tsvetov] To this one has to add the serious and very decisive tendencies to set up a nuclear-free zone in the southern part of the Pacific.

[Shishlin] Yes, certainly. But citing some positive facts, one cannot, unfortunately, pass over negative facts in silence in particular, the decision by the Japanese cabinet to join the U.S. SDI...

[Tsvetov, interrupting] The stepping up of the U.S. naval activity near our shores in the Sea of Japan and in the northeastern part of the Pacific.

[Shishlin] Yes, and this is such a demonstrative activity that is, in addition, coupled with the activity we are observing in the Baltic, in the North Sea a very large-scale naval exercise called "Northern Wedding." Hundreds of ships, a large number of military aircraft, and huge numbers of troops have been brought into action there. But coming back to the Asian-Pacific region, all this, undoubtedly, shows that the way to peace and to making relations healthier is not a simple way. But this is a promising road because the Soviet proposals are being built not on some hollow ground, but they are really coming out of the real situation that we encounter in this vast zone. I think that the future -- without simplifying this future -- belongs to the ideas that are in line with the thoughts expounded during the Far Eastern trip by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

[Tsvetov] There are plusses in this region, compared to Europe, and minuses.

I would ascribe the following to minuses: the causes for regional conflict in the Asian-Pacific region are much more varied than in Europe. Yet, on the other hand, there are no ossified multilateral military-political associations in this region, unlike in Europe, associations that would be difficult to reconcile and to disband. This makes the implementation of the ideas suggested by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev easier.

[Bogdanov] In any case, if one casts a broader look on this problem, I do not see, frankly speaking, more effective ways and recipes for solving these problems than the thoughts and suggestions set forth by Mikhail Sergeyevich in Vladivostok. I simply do not know other proposals, I simply do not know other opinions on how to adjust the situation in the Pacific region...

[Tsvetov, Interrupting] It is nothing but natural that you do not know because there are simply no other proposals...

[Bogdanov, interrupting] This is exactly what I mean...

[Tsvetov] All these proposals have soaked into themselves all that has already been endured by the experience of Asian countries, starting from Bandung. All has been included here, all those proposals that were made on the governmental level of the countries belonging to this region, and on the public level. That is why these proposals cannot fail to attract attention both from the public and from the governments.

[Bogdanov] And, on the other hand, of course our proposals are not a monopoly or the last word. We are always open for some reciprocal moves, for proposals that would supplement or specify, that would lead to negotiations. In one word, you have on your table a Pacific concept of security and an invitation to sit and discuss.

[Shishlin] As you see, there are really lots of problems, but the sky is not totally overcast. Though September 1986 has had a rather dramatic start, I think that to date, not a single door has been shut, there is still time to think; there is still time to act and, most important, there is the need to act. Strictly speaking, this is exactly what our country has been advocating.

[Tsvetov] Comrades, here I would like to end our conversation at the round table. All the best to you.

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CSO: 5200/1587

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S VORONTSOV DISCUSSES MORATORIUM, CDE IN PARIS

Meets With Mitterrand

LD042030 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1929 GMT 4 Sep 86

[Text] Paris, 4 Sep (TASS)--French President Francois Mitterrand received USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. M. Vorontsov, who has arrived in Paris. Talks also took place with French Foreign Minister Raimond, and other senior French Foreign Ministry representatives.

Participating in the meetings and conversations was Soviet Ambassador to France P. Rayabov. In addition to the exchange of views during the Soviet-French summit talks this past July, current international problems were discussed, including a Near East settlement. The exchange of views is to be continued.

Discusses Test Ban, CDE

LD051056 Moscow TASS in English 1040 GMT 5 Sep 86

[Text] Paris September 5 TASS -- Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR who is staying here, has met with representatives of the mass media of France and other countries. He called their attention to the continuation of the arms race which promoted the aggravation of the menace of war threatening the whole of mankind and recalled the Soviet peace initiatives, primarily those which had been set forth in the statement of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, of August 18. Vorontsov pointed out the importance of the decision of the USSR to prolong the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and of its proposal to the U.S. to join it and to conclude a corresponding agreement. Yuliy Vorontsov pointed out that the initiative had met with positive response in the world. Only a small group of people in the U.S. administration resisted it. He pointed out in this connection the important role played by the public in the struggle for disarmament.

Vorontsov told journalists about the contribution made by the Soviet Union to the creation of conditions for a successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and assured them of the readiness of the USSR for a further development of the all-European process. He dwelt on the present state of Soviet-French relations and prospects of their development in the political, trade, economic and other spheres.

Answering questions of journalists, he explained the approach of the Soviet Union to the settlement of the Middle East conflict, to the settlement of the situation around Afghanistan and the elimination of local conflicts. [as received]

Comments on Inspections

PM081523 Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Sep 86 p 2

[Michel Tatu report: "Mr Vorontsov Expresses 'Sympathy' with Paris Following This 'Provocation'"]

[Excerpts] Yuliy Vorontsov, former USSR ambassador to Paris, became first deputy foreign minister this spring and one of the protagonists of the "restructuring" of Soviet diplomacy started by Anatoliy Dobrynin, his former boss in Washington who is now Mr Gorbachev's main adviser.

This is what he came to demonstrate on a brief visit to Paris, during which he met with Mr Mitterrand at the Elysee, and with Mr Raimond and several of his aides at the Quai d'Orsay (he told us he did not have time to meet with Mr Chirac, who will, however, be welcomed in Moscow at the end of the year on a visit he has been invited to make). At a press conference held at his embassy on Thursday 4 September he combined the subtlety of the "new political thinking" with professionalism and was friendly, cautious, and inflexible according to the subjects raised.

In the disarmament sphere, he stressed what he sees as two concessions, namely the USSR's acceptance of on-the-spot monitoring, particularly during military maneuvers: First it will be possible to carry out such monitoring in the absence of disarmament measures, contrary to what Soviet diplomacy had always demanded; second, it will be able to cover the western part of the USSR, whereas the United States will not have to undergo such monitoring.

It is true that at the same time Marshal Akhromeyev, Red Army chief of general staff, made a statement to the TASS agency in which he gave details which considerably limit the scope of this monitoring. Land and air inspections will certainly be accepted, he said, but the latter will have to be carried out on board planes of the country inspected, piloted by its nationals. Foreign monitoring officials on board will merely "indicate to the pilot what course to take and where to bank to be able to observe the ground." He added that there is, therefore, no question of allowing overflight by foreign aircraft filled with instruments which could collect information about "any installation not subject to monitoring."

This is likely to complicate the latest negotiations at the Stockholm conference, which are due to be concluded at the end of this month. However, Mr Vorontsov was anxious to issue this warning now: Any failure "will not be our fault."

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CSO: 5200/1587

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA ON ARMS RACE, U.S. MILITARY THREAT

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 5 Jun 86) pp 30-31

[Article, published under the heading "At the Fronts of the Ideological Struggle," by Honored Cultural Worker RSFSR Col I. Filatov: "Two Approaches to the Same Problem"]

[Text] ...It is becoming increasingly obvious that intelligent solutions are not to be found through war -- neither international nor domestic solutions. The clash and struggle of opposite approaches to the prospects of world development have taken on a particularly complex character."

From the Proceedings of the 27th CPSU Congress

Assessing the present international situation, the 27th CPSU Congress stressed that the problem of war and peace is the most acute problem of the present day. Imperialism is threatening a third world war. It is placing the achievements of man's genius in the service of creating monstrous destructive force. The policy of imperialist circles, who are willing to sacrifice the destiny of entire peoples, is heightening the danger that these weapons may be brought into play. At the same time it has become even more obvious that nuclear war cannot serve as a means of resolving intergovernmental problems and disputes between different social systems. The unleashing of nuclear war in conditions of the present world military-strategic balance is tantamount to suicide for the aggressor himself. "Consequently, not only nuclear war proper but also preparations for such a war, that is, the arms race and the striving to achieve military superiority, cannot objectively bring political gain to anybody," it was stressed at the 27th CPSU Congress.

In spite of these generally-acknowledged conclusions, the reactionary forces of imperialism, and the United States in particular, have not given up their hopes for recouping social losses. They are counting on achieving military superiority over socialism by developing offensive space-based weapon systems, new weapons of mass destruction, and highly-accurate means of delivery. The United States, for example, is engaged in an intensive search for "acceptable" variations of wars on the earth and in space.

At the same time the mass media and the entire U.S. governmental ideological edifice are continuing to present reality in a distorted form, seeking to foist upon the U.S. public the notion of "Moscow's perfidy" and "response measures by Washington," and are seeking to justify the U.S. arms race. Following the Geneva summit meeting, the United States launched an anti-Soviet campaign with renewed energy.

In contrast to imperialism, which seeks to halt the advance of history by force and to return to the past, socialism has never of its own will linked its future with military solutions to international problems. Acting in the "spirit of Geneva," the Soviet Union, with the aim of ensuring a firm peace and security of peoples, has proposed an all-encompassing aggregate of measures which cut off all avenues to the arms race -- both in space and on earth, including nuclear, chemical, and conventional arms.

A large-scale, specific program of total and universal elimination of nuclear arms, tailored precisely to the times, proposed in a statement by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade M. S. Gorbachev on 15 January 1986, the first such proposal since the beginning of the nuclear age, has been greeted as a realistic way to bring the planet out of the impasse of confrontation and nuclear threat and has been given approval by the world community. It states a truly great aim -- to enter the third millennium without weapons of mass destruction, and of course prohibiting offensive space weapons, on the basis of mutually acceptable and rigorously-monitored agreements.

Our demand for the mandatory prohibiting of space weapons is quite understandable, for these weapons, being developed by the United States on the basis of the SDI Program, are intended not only for defense, as a "shield" against warheads, but also for attack. The U.S. press itself has frankly informed the world community on this score. Such SDI weapons as lasers can destroy not only enemy warheads but also individual targets on the earth, and even entire cities.

The USSR has on three different occasions extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear test explosions and has proposed immediate assumption of talks on ceasing all nuclear testing. The Soviet side has advanced compromise proposals, seeking to accommodate the West, at conferences in Vienna and Stockholm. The USSR has proposed the mutual withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. naval forces from the Mediterranean.

The 27th CPSU Congress, ratifying these measures, advanced the basic points for establishing an all-encompassing system of international security.

The Soviet plan for guaranteeing the security of peoples and consolidating world peace demonstrates the ability of our party realistically and objectively to assess the processes taking place in the world and flexibly to respond to the demands of the moment. These include bold approaches, new political thinking, and an awareness of responsibility for the fate of peoples. The Soviet Union proposes that we enter the third millennium not with programs of "up-arming" and "Star Wars," but with substantial projects

involving the peaceful exploration and development of space by the resources of all mankind and a genuine guarantee of the security of peoples.

It is apparent from all indications, however, that the United States is unwilling to give up its armament plans, especially the "Star Wars" program. U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz has stated right out that the United States will continue with SDI and that no changes are anticipated in this position. "The priority emphasis we are giving to the 'Strategic Defense Initiative' is well known and remains entirely in force," he is seconded by the U.S. Secretary of Defense. President Reagan himself, while claiming to welcome Soviet peace initiatives, is taking no practical steps toward their support and implementation.

A conclusion suggests itself: by hindering solution to the problem of nonmilitarization of space, the present U.S. Administration has no desire to cease the arms race on earth, which is generating immense profits for the military-industrial complex, to the detriment of the security of peoples, including the American people. The SDI budget request for fiscal year 1987, for example, is 4.8 billion dollars -- almost twice as much as in the current fiscal year.

From the standpoint of military strategy, the United States is linking to implementation of the SDI program the illusory hope of launching with impunity a disarming attack on the USSR utilizing strategic nuclear weapons (the strategic triad) as well as weapons deployed in space. The United States is intensively engaged in nuclear testing toward this end, justifying its actions with the claim that fewer such tests have allegedly been conducted by the United States than by the USSR. In actuality, however, according to the figures of the Stockholm Institute on Problems of Peace, as of the beginning of 1985 the United States had detonated 772 nuclear explosions, while the USSR had detonated only 556. One should bear in mind thereby that the Soviet Union has not conducted any nuclear tests since 6 August 1985, while the United States has continued nuclear testing contrary to the will of peoples. The most recent tests must be viewed as a show of force challenging the Soviet Union and the entire world. And yet Washington proposes to us that not the prohibition of nuclear testing be "monitored" but rather the procedure of improving nuclear weapons.

The Pentagon is planning to bring into operational service by the end of the present decade 100 MX missiles carrying 1,000 nuclear warheads and 100 B-1B bombers each carrying a payload of 57 tons, capable of carrying up to 3,000 nuclear warheads on a single sortie. The first B-1Bs have already been delivered to Dyess Air Force Base (Texas). At the end of 1986 the first squadron of the new bombers will begin standing alert duty. In addition, work is continuing on development of the ATB ("Stealth") bomber. The Navy will take delivery on 5-6 "Ohio" class nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines, which in a single launch of Trident I and Trident II missiles can deliver approximately 1,200 warheads to their targets. The U.S. military will be taking delivery on several thousand long-range cruise missiles of various basing modes.

According to reports in the foreign press, the United States is proceeding at a priority pace with development of and equipping its forces with the newest highly-accurate conventional weapons, development of combined automated troop command and control systems at all levels, and reorganization of the armed forces in conformity with the Army-90 Program.

Under pressure applied by the United States, that country's NATO allies as well as Japan are picking up the pace of military preparations. Combat training of U.S. and NATO troops is taking on a clearly-marked anti-Soviet thrust, training based on the "airland operation" concept. This concept prescribes employment of all types of weapons to destroy targets over large areas, delivering strikes on the support echelons of Warsaw Pact forces, on airfields, lines of communication, command posts, and other facilities situated at a distance of 15-150 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area in the combat zone, with the aim, as is stated in a new field manual, of "defeating the Soviet Union and its allies in case of a conflict in Europe."

The United States has adopted the so-called "aerospace doctrine." According to this doctrine, "the military should no longer make a distinction between the atmosphere, in which aircraft operate, and near-Earth space." Implementing this doctrine, the United States is carrying out an extensive program which calls for building military air superiority over the USSR. The U.S. Air Force plans to have 38 instead of 24 tactical air wings and more than 1,000 military transport aircraft in the near future.

A total of 28 B-52 strategic bombers, Tactical Air Command and Military Airlift Command units, strategic reconnaissance aircraft and AWACS long-range radar detection and control aircraft are being assigned to the interventionist rapid deployment forces. A new heavy military transport aircraft, the CX, is being developed for these forces.

Large-scale U.S. and NATO military exercises and maneuvers are of a clearly-marked anti-Soviet character. The quantity of forces and assets taking part in these activities is increasing. They are taking on an increasingly more provocative character and are being transformed into barefaced "saber rattling" directly along the borders of the USSR as well as other socialist and independent sovereign states.

The geography of the Pentagon's militaristic wargames is extremely broad. This year almost 5,000 U.S. military personnel were deployed to Honduras, where the Terencio Sierra 86 maneuvers were held close to the Nicaraguan border -- a rehearsal for a possible invasion by U.S.-Honduran troops into the Sandinista Republic.

As part of the Reforger exercise, the Pentagon transported from the United States to Western Europe approximately 20,000 military personnel and almost 300,000 tons of military equipment and supplies. The culmination point of these war games was a large-scale exercise held on the territory of the FRG in immediate proximity to the borders of Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

The large-scale Team Spirit 86 maneuvers were conducted in the East, involving tens of thousands of U.S. and South Korean military personnel. Recently the White House administration has been intensively engaged in developing the doctrine of "new globalism," which calls for direct U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of developing sovereign states. The concept of "low-intensity conflicts," such as the intervention in Grenada and acts of provocation against Nicaragua and other countries are one aspect of this doctrine.

Washington conducted a truly militaristic orgy off the coast of Libya, with a naval armada, including aircraft carriers, steaming into those waters. An attack was mounted against this country.

This is why, as regards preserving peace and saving mankind from the threat of nuclear annihilation, it was emphasized at the 27th CPSU Congress, today nobody can remain uninvolved. Every country, regardless of its sociopolitical system, must contribute to this cause.

At the talks on mutual reduction of forces and arms in Central Europe, the Western parties to the talks are generally receptive to the proposals by the socialist countries calling for initial reduction of Soviet and U.S. troops in combination with subsequently maintaining for a specified period of time the current NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels in this region. Response proposals by the NATO member countries, however, are in a number of aspects of a one-sided and unrealistic nature. In place of efforts to lower the level of military confrontation, they offer complicated monitoring proposals.

At the Stockholm Conference on strengthening confidence-building measures, security and disarmament in Europe, where there is a real possibility of reaching mutually acceptable solutions, the Western countries have been attempting to sidestep such an important issue as giving notice of air force and naval exercises, although the experience of history and that of modern conflicts indicates that air and naval forces are of great importance and frequently of determining significance in the conduct of combat operations.

Proposing a specific program of total, across-the-board elimination of nuclear weapons and advocating the nonmilitarization of space, the elimination of chemical weapons, and reduction of conventional arms and forces, the USSR is exposing the phony thesis of "Soviet military threat" peddled by the ideologues of imperialism. Resolute actions by the Soviet State in defense of peace and improving the overall international climate is not an indication of weakness but a manifestation of our consistent peace-seeking foreign policy, passed down to us by V. I. Lenin.

In the present conditions the Soviet State is constructing its foreign policy taking into account an aggregate of real factors. Addressing a meeting of workers in the city of Tolyatti, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade M. S. Gorbachev emphasized that we shall not allow ourselves to be caught napping. The Soviet State has proven repeatedly that it is capable of responding to any challenge. If it becomes necessary, it will respond in an adequate fashion this time as well. We do not seek greater security, as was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, nor shall we accept less security.

Actively pursuing a policy of peace, the Soviet Union is ready and willing to engage in broad interaction with all those who adopt a position of intelligence and good will and acknowledgment of responsibility for securing the future of mankind -- without wars and without weapons. But as long as there exists the danger of unleashing of aggression by imperialism, military conflicts and various acts of provocation, the CPSU and Soviet Government consider it essential, states the CPSU Program, that the USSR Armed Forces remain at a level excluding the possibility of strategic superiority by the forces of imperialism, that the defense capability of the Soviet State improve across the board, and that the fighting alliance of the armies of the brother socialist countries become stronger.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS: FURTHER REPORTS ON BUDAPEST PUGWASH DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

UK's Rotblat Speaks

LD041501 Moscow TASS in English 1347 GMT 3 Sep 86

[Text] Budapest, 3 Sep (TASS)--TASS correspondent Sergey Ivanov reporting:

The speakers at the 36th Pugwash Conference, now in progress here, expressed profound concern over the future of humankind and voiced their readiness to scale up actions in order to head off a nuclear holocaust.

Some 170 authoritative scientists from nearly 50 countries had arrived in the capital of Hungary to discuss urgent matters related to the effort to safeguard peace.

Professor Joseph Rotblat (Great Britain), a member of the Pugwash executive committee, told the TASS correspondent in an interview that at the present time it was important to explain and prove to politicians from the scientific point of view that the arms race was senseless and that the further development of military-related technologies was dangerous.

The situation in the world had dramatically deteriorated in the past few years, Professor Rotblat went on to say, and the conditions for the East-West dialogue had become more complicated.

A real threat of the transfer of the arms race to space had emerged at the present time, he added. But such a move would not only complicate the international situation, complex as it was, but also would give an impetus to a new, even more dangerous and expensive, spiral of the arms race.

Professor Rotblat emphasized that the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions had opened up a realistic road toward ridding the human race of the threat of a nuclear war. In his opinion, that responsible decision once again confirmed the goodwill of the Soviet Union.

Bulgarian Scientist Speaks

LD040634 Moscow TASS in English 1648 GMT 3 Sep 86

[Text] Budapest, 3 Sep (TASS)--TASS correspondent Sergey Ivanov reports:

Participants in the Pugwash Conference, under way here, voice their profound anxiety over the destinies of the world and readiness for stepping up actions to stop a nuclear disaster and curb the arms race.

"We shall continue stepping up joint efforts of scientists throughout the world to prevent a nuclear disaster," Academician Angel Balevsky, president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, told TASS. He emphasized that there would not and could not be victors in a nuclear war. "As representatives of world science, we understand better than anybody else the danger entailed by the arms race and understand dreadful and irreversible consequences of a nuclear conflict.

"The Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions is a unique historic chance to channel the course of mankind's development along the road of peace, friendship, trust, mutual understanding and cooperation," Angel Balevsky went on to say. "This is a confidence-building measure on the part of the Soviet Union, which confirms its constructive stand of principle and shows a serious approach of the Soviet side to analysis of the present-day situation in the world. To lose such a chance would mean political irresponsibility," noted the Bulgarian scientist.

Anatoliy Gromyko Interview

[Editorial Report] AU090501 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian on 6 September on page 7 carries a 1,400-page interview given by Anatoliy Gromyko, director of the African Institute in Moscow, to Miklos Ritecz, under the headline: "For the elimination of new sources of danger--Anatoliy Gromyko on the Pugwash Conference in Budapest."

Asked about the atmosphere of the conference, Anatoliy Gromyko, who "has made his voice heard more frequently of late on matters of disarmament," says in the beginning of the interview that "the conference is being carried out in an objective atmosphere" and is trying to show the way leading to the elimination of the tensions in the international situation," the further deterioration of which is posing a threat possessing the element of certain strategic chaos." He calls for a "tenfold increase" in work to avoid a deterioration in the relations between the two military blocks and praises the increasing efforts made by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries toward this end. As for the recent initiatives coming from Moscow, Gromyko points out the importance of Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal of 15 January this year on eliminating all nuclear and chemical weapons by the year 2000 and the recently extended moratorium on underground nuclear tests.

Asked about the chances of the United States joining the moratorium, Gromyko recalls his recent visit to the United States and his talks with officials and scientists and expresses his conviction that "the majority of the scientists and experts are against 'star wars' and against nuclear tests" and that, as a result, there is increasing pressure on the administration to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union.

As for the chances of a breakthrough in this respect at the planned summit, Gromyko is for "concrete and, if possible, important agreements" being reached at the summit as "there is no point in just having an empty discussion." In his view, much depends on the way the sides regard the exchange of views, and the Soviet Union "needs more signs in order to look forward to a possible summit with confidence. If the White House thought not only of its own interests but also of those of the other side, progress would be easier to achieve."

Toward the end of the interview, Anatoliy Gromyko reiterates the Soviet position when asked about the acceptable agreement on verification of a moratorium on nuclear tests and on disarmament, saying that "we would allow verification to take place once or twice a year also within our borders."

The last part of the interview deals with the role of the so-called small countries in promoting the process of disarmament. Dealing with the subject, Anatoliy Gromyko praises the peace initiatives of the medium-size and small countries and gives the example of the late Olof Palme and the recent Delhi appeal of "the six." He draws the conclusion that "the fate of an initiative depends on its nature rather than on the size of the state that has come up with it."

In conclusion, Anatoliy Gromyko praises the Pugwash Conference and the Pugwash movement, which "played an important role in the past in working out the methods of verification of underground nuclear tests," and expresses his wish to find a way "leading to the elimination of the sources of danger."

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET OFFICIALS, SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSS ARMS ISSUES

Ryzhkov Meeting 5 Sep

LD051557 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1512 GMT 5 Sep 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 5 Sep (TASS)--Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, today received in the Kremlin Pierre Aubert, deputy chairman of the Federal Council and head of the Federal Department (minister) of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation.

In the discussion of international issues it was emphasized that the alarming state of affairs which has currently unfolded in the world urgently requires the mobilization of the forces of all states to adopt radical measures to end the nuclear arms race, halt their spread to space, ban and scrap chemical weapons, and to reduce armed forces and conventional arms. In this connection Nikolay Ryzhkov noted the particular significance of the Soviet Union's decision announced on 18 August of this year by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to prolong the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests to 1 January 1987. An end to nuclear tests would be the first decisive step on the path to delivering mankind from nuclear weapons.

Pierre Aubert confirmed the Swiss government's efforts to further the strengthening of peace and the revival of detente. Neutral Switzerland welcomes the initiatives and practical steps which are leading to a lowering of the level of military confrontation on the European Continent and to a growth a confidence in relations between states.

In the course of the conversation there was emphasis on the significance of the pan-European process as an important tool for states' constructive interaction to strengthen peace, security, and peaceful cooperation. The two sides expressed their desire to develop this in all directions.

The conversation took place in an atmosphere of mutual respect and well-intentioned frankness.

Shevardnadze Talks, 5, 6 Sep

LD061221 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1030 GMT 6 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow, 6 Sep (tass) — On 5-6 September talks were held in Moscow between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs; and Pierre Aubert, deputy chairman of the Federal Council and head of the Federal Department (minister) of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation, who is in the USSR on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

There was an exchange of opinions, in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, on topical aspects of the European and international situations. At the center of it lay issues relating to the sphere of security, including the prospects for realizing a reduction in nuclear arms, banning and scrapping chemical weapons, and lowering the level of military confrontation in Europe and the world.

The hope was expressed that the states which are advocating the removal of the nuclear threat and bringing about a breakthrough in international affairs, will, as far as they are able to do so, further the achievement of a bilateral -- Soviet-U.S. -- or multilateral accord on not carrying out nuclear weapons tests and rejecting any nuclear blasts.

Pierre Aubert said that Switzerland advocates a total rejection of nuclear weapons and would sincerely like the appropriate accords on nuclear and space arms to be concluded at the Soviet-U.S. talks. It also supports the idea of a reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe with the equal security of the sides being guaranteed.

Both sides spoke out for a successful completion of the Stockholm conference and for a dynamic staging of the forthcoming Vienna meeting of the states participating in the Helsinki conference. Taking into account the significance of the Vienna forum they consider it purposeful to open it at foreign minister level.

The sides advocated a search for ways of eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension in various areas of the world fraught with dangerous complications for peace and international security.

The ministers expressed their satisfaction with the state of bilateral relations and confirmed their readiness for their further comprehensive development.

'Vremya' on Talks

LD062113 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 6 Sep 86

[Article from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The talks between Comrade Shevardnadze and Pierre Aubert, vice president of the Federal Council, head of the Federal Department, minister of foreign affairs of the Swiss Confederation, who is in our country on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government were continued today in Moscow.

Comrade Shevardnadze stressed that the decision made by the Soviet leadership on extending the unilateral moratorium on holding all nuclear tests to 1 January next year reflects the Soviet Union's determination to do everything possible to stop the nuclear arms race and to convince the U.S. Government to take action toward nuclear disarmament.

Pierre Aubert said that Switzerland is in favor of completely rejecting nuclear weapons and sincerely wishes that the appropriate accords on nuclear and space weapons might be reached at the Soviet-U.S. talks. It also supports the idea of reducing the armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe while ensuring the equal security of the sides. The ministers expressed satisfaction

at the state of bilateral relations and affirmed their willingness for their further all-round development. (Video shows delegations sitting at table).

Pierre Aubert invited Comrade Shevardnadze to visit the Swiss Confederation on an official visit. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

Radio on Talks

LD061215 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 6 Sep 86

[Text] Talks were held in Moscow on 5-6 September between Comrade Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Aubert, deputy chairman of the Federal Council, chief of the federal department of foreign affairs of the Swiss Confederation, who is in the USSR on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

An exchange of views on topical aspects of the European and international situation was conducted in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere. It focussed on matters relating to the sphere of security, including prospects for putting into effect a reduction of nuclear armaments, and banning and elimination of chemical weapons and the reduction of the level of military confrontation in Europe and the world. Particular attention was paid to a discussion of the concept of a nuclear--free world that was put forward in the statement of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January this year, and the idea of creating a comprehensive system of international security that was formulated in the political report to the 27th CPSU Congress.

Comrade Shevardnadze stressed that the traditional policy of neutrality pursued by Switzerland was viewed by the Soviet side as a positive element in the maintenance of peace in Europe. The sides spoke out in favor of a search for ways of eliminating existing sources of tension in various regions of the world, which are fraught with the risk of dangerous complications for peace and international security.

The ministers voiced satisfaction with the state of bilateral relations and reaffirmed a willingness for their further comprehensive development.

They also advocated extending mutually-advantageous trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation and exchanges in the cultural sphere.

Aubert invited Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze to pay an official visit to the Swiss Confederation. The invitation was gratefully accepted.

Shevardnadze Dinner Speech

PM081346 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Sep 86 First Edition p 4

[Excerpts] Talks started 5 September in Moscow between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Pierre Aubert, deputy chairman of the Federal Council and chief of the Federal Department (minister) of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation. The same day the ministers signed an intergovernmental agreement on i-sues of taxation.

Eduard Shevardnadze gave a dinner in honor of Pierre Aubert. On the Soviet side, the dinner was attended by Nikolay Talyzin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; USSR ministers, heads of a number of ministries and department; and other officials; on the Swiss side, by those accompanying Pierre Aubert.

In his speech, Eduard Shevardnadze said:

In the Soviet Union, they look with respect upon the choice of the status of permanent neutrality made by Switzerland and its role as a country of "good services" in the matter of arranging and keeping up a productive dialogue between East and West. The readiness of the Swiss Government to create the most favorable conditions for conducting negotiations on nuclear and space arms and on questions of ending nuclear weapons tests shows expressively enough where Switzerland's sympathies lie, and how it would like to see the international situation.

As far as we are concerned, our actions indicate best of all the thrust of Soviet policy and its objectives: We are persistently striving to achieve the realization of a program to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons, as set out in the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January that year. The Soviet Union, by its actions, confirms its commitment to the idea of a nuclear-free world. Our unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests has been in force for 13 months now, and it will remain in force until January 1 1987. This is an act of exceptional importance, undertaken in the interests of peace and the future of mankind.

All people, every state -- both nuclear or nonnuclear, large or small, neutral or a member of a military alliance -- is vitally interested in freeing the earth of nuclear weapons, as it is absolutely obvious that there are no borders for nuclear weapons, and that they are not selective. This is exactly why the problem of a moratorium on nuclear tests cannot lie beyond the national competence of any state, and nobody can be neutral about this.

We are also counting on a favorable perception by the Swiss side of the proposal to set up a comprehensive system of international security, and on constructive participation of your country in the development of specific aspects of such a system.

Switzerland invariably plays an active role in the development of all-European process, and in this area our countries cooperate closely and with benefit for this cause. This is currently particularly true with regard to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe. We can sense the sincere desire of the Swiss side to promote in every way possible the successful completion of this forum.

Your activeness in Stockholm is very important as much as in the final stages of complex multilateral negotiations it is the neutral and nonaligned states that can have something particularly significant to say in the search for compromise options and solutions.

We note with satisfaction that on many questions the positions of our two countries are close and compatible, and that by and large we are working in the same direction.

We are confident of the fact that interaction between the Soviet Union and Switzerland will broaden and spread to an ever wider spectrum of international problems, becoming particularly close on issues of war and peace and strengthening universal security.

One would like to hope that your visit to the Soviet Union, Mr Federal Councillor, the frank exchange of opinions on a wide circle of international problems and issues of bilateral relations will open up new opportunities for parallel actions and cooperation. Our prospects are good. We can confidently direct ourselves toward a strengthening of the good and friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Switzerland.

This cannot fail to bring joy. We sincerely want things to go well for you. [PRAVDA follows the report on Shevardnadze's speech with a report on Aubert's speech in reply and adds that "the dinner passed in a friendly atmosphere."]

Aubert Kremlin Dinner Speech

PM091552 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Sep 86 First Edition p 4

[TASS report on speech by P. Aubert, vice president of the Federal Council and chief of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation, at 5 September Moscow dinner given in his honor by USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze]

[Excerpts] The policy of active neutrality also presupposes participation in international cooperation and the quest for solutions to global problems. In this regard Switzerland makes efforts aimed at helping to improve the political climate in Europe and, within the framework of its potential, takes part in the work of many international organizations and is always prepared to offer its territory for international organizations and conferences and also for bilateral meetings. This policy is imbued with a commitment to the principles of international law, which we strive to disseminate and develop. The system of values on which our state is founded places human dignity at the center of our concerns.

The tension threatening international security is the reason why Switzerland participates highly actively in the CSCE process. Our country cooperates with all states participating in the all-European process, and particularly with Europe's neutral and nonaligned countries, with a view to finding solutions which are acceptable to all. Acting in this way, we uphold our society's fundamental values and we cannot and do not wish to separate the three CSCE "baskets" from one another--everything must be done to ensure a balanced advance. After all, quests for stability and security will be in vain unless the free exchange of ideas, people, and material values is guaranteed. At the same time, it is necessary to expand international cooperation in the spheres contained in the second "basket," be it atmospheric pollution or defense against nuclear radiation. It is a pleasure to note in this respect that the initiatives of the Soviet Union and Switzerland usefully complement one another.

Switzerland is also making considerable efforts aimed at achieving weighty results at the Stockholm Conference. Taking into account our strategic interests and the status of permanent armed neutrality, we support the international community's efforts in the arms control sphere. It is obvious that

the greatest responsibility here lies with the great powers. At the same time Switzerland firmly intends to make its contribution to finding practical and verifiable control measures and toward strengthening international trust. It will be impossible to halt the arms race without progress in this direction.

In conclusion P. Aubert wished health to M.S. Gorbachev, A.A. Gromyko, and E. A. Shevardnadze and happiness and health to all Soviet citizens, and expressed wishes for the further development of relations between Switzerland and the USSR and for peace in Europe and all over the world.

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